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PATENT LAW’S REPRODUCIBILITY
PARADOX
JACOB S. SHERKOW†
ABSTRACT
Clinical research faces a reproducibility crisis. Many recent clinical
and preclinical studies appear to be irreproducible—their results
cannot be verified by outside researchers. This is problematic for not
only scientific reasons but also legal ones: patents grounded in
irreproducible research appear to fail their constitutional bargain of
property rights in exchange for working disclosures of inventions. The
culprit is likely patent law’s doctrine of enablement. Although the
doctrine requires patents to enable others to make and use their claimed
inventions, current difficulties in applying the doctrine hamper or even
actively dissuade reproducible data in patents. This Article assesses the
difficulties in reconciling these basic goals of scientific research and
patent law. More concretely, it provides several examples of
irreproducibility in patents on blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris,
Plavix, and Avastin—and discusses some of the social costs of the
misalignment between good clinical practice and patent doctrine.
Ultimately, this analysis illuminates several current debates concerning
innovation policy. It strongly suggests that a proper conception of
enablement should take into account after-arising evidence. It also
sheds light on the true purpose—and limits—of patent disclosure. And
lastly, it untangles the doctrines of enablement and utility.
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INTRODUCTION
Clinical research currently faces a reproducibility crisis. Francis S.
Collins, the former Director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH),
recently voiced the concern “that the complex system for ensuring the
reproducibility of biomedical research is failing and is in need of
restructuring.”1 An economics review of preclinical research estimated
that U.S. researchers spend approximately $28 billion per year on
irreproducible studies.2 The Economist stated bluntly: “Scientists like

1. Francis S. Collins & Lawrence A. Tabak, NIH Plans to Enhance Reproducibility, 505
NATURE 612, 612 (2014).
2. Leonard P. Freedman, Iain M. Cockburn & Timothy S. Simcoe, The Economics of
Reproducibility in Preclinical Research, PLOS BIOLOGY, June 9, 2015, at 3.
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to think of science as self-correcting. To an alarming degree, it is not.”3
Although reproducibility—the verification of scientific results by
outside researchers—lies at the heart of the scientific method,4 “the
checks and balances that once ensured scientific fidelity have been
hobbled.”5 And patent law is at least partly to blame.
Because patents require their inventors to sufficiently disclose
their inventions to others—enough to enable their peers to “make and
use” their claimed inventions6—it would seem that patent law provides
a bulwark against irreproducibility. But it does not. To the contrary,
the availability of patents for the products of clinical research appears
to hamper or even actively dissuade reproducibility.7 Since

3. Trouble at the Lab, ECONOMIST (Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21588057-scientists-think-science-self-correcting-alarming-degree-it-not-trouble [https://
perma.cc/NHT8-WPW8].
4. See H.M. COLLINS, CHANGING ORDER: REPLICATION AND INDUCTION IN SCIENTIFIC
PRACTICE 19 (1992) (“Replication is the scientifically institutionalized counterpart of the stability
of perception.”); KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 9 Routledge Classics
(2002) (1959) (“The purpose of this [verification] is to find out how far the new consequences of
[a] theory—whatever may be new in what it asserts—stand up to the demands of practice, whether
raised by purely scientific experiments, or by practical technological applications.”); Dmitry
Karshtedt, Limits on Hard-to-Reproduce Inventions: Process Elements and Biotechnology’s
Compliance with the Enablement Requirement, 3 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 109, 109 (2011)
(“Reproducibility is the touchstone of the scientific method and one of the strongest norms of the
research community.”); Sören Sonnenburg et al., The Need for Open Source Software in Machine
Learning, 8 J. MACH. LEARNING RES. 2443, 2449 (2007) (“In many areas of science it is only when
an experiment has been corroborated independently by another group of researchers that it is
generally accepted by the scientific community.”); Victoria Stodden, Reproducing Statistical
Results, 2 ANN. REV. STAT. APPLICATIONS 1, 2–4 (2015) [hereinafter Stodden, Reproducing
Statistical Results]. Stodden notes:
A fundamental goal of statistics is to ensure the reproducibility of scientific
findings. . . . If discoveries are made, it is of great interest to understand whether these
findings persist in different samples, which may be drawn from the same or different
populations, and potentially with different measurement or estimation techniques. The
persistence of findings across different samples is the basis upon which scientific claims
are evaluated.
Id. at 2. To be clear, reproducibility and replicability are related but distinct concepts, and the
differences between them may be nuanced. See generally Chris Drummond, Replicability Is Not
Reproducibility: Nor Is It Good Science, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EVALUATION METHODS FOR
MACHINE LEARNING WORKSHOP AT THE 26TH ICML, MONTREAL, CANADA (2009) (analyzing
the differences between replicability and reproducibility). To the extent these concepts can be
separated, this Article focuses on what can be considered classic reproducibility—whether the
results of a scientific experiment are, in some greater sense, “true.” See POPPER, supra, at 195
(discussing “the idea of a reproducible physical effect—an idea which is closely connected with
that of objectivity”).
5. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
7. See, e.g., In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(disallowing postapplication evidence to satisfy enablement); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222
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pharmaceutical manufacturers often structure drug development and
clinical research around patent protection,8 patent law’s deficiencies
with respect to disclosure encourage manufacturers to engage in
research—often, irreproducible research—that satisfies the bare
minimum needed to obtain protection. This failure of patent law
exacerbates the current real-world reproducibility crisis.9 This Article
is the first to explore how patent law—in particular, the weakness of
patent law’s enablement doctrine—has contributed to failing standards
of scientific integrity despite its constitutional objective “to promote
the Progress of Science.”10
Ironically, this disconnect stems from the mechanism by which
patents are supposed to promote scientific progress: disclosure. Patents
serve as a quid pro quo: inventors publicly disclose their inventions in
return for exclusionary rights. Patent law, in turn, governs the
substance and form of inventors’ disclosures.11 To that end, patent law’s
F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (allowing an amendment—and rejecting the defendant’s theory
of invalidity—to redefine a scientifically dynamic claim term); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent,
Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting evidence that a patent failed to disclose an
important method of practicing the invention).
8. See Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms Underinvest in LongTerm Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2045–46 (2015)
(describing how the structure of the patent system perverts clinical trial structures).
9. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612 (discussing reproducibility in the context of
preclinical drug studies). See generally Nicholas S. Downing et al., Clinical Trial Evidence
Supporting FDA Approval of Novel Therapeutic Agents, 2005–2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 368
(2014) (empirically assessing the reproducibility of new, and presumably patented, drugs);
Douglas F. Easton et al., Gene-Panel Sequencing and the Prediction of Breast Cancer Risk, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2243 (2015) (analyzing the lack of reproducibility for several patented genepanel sequencing tests); John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,
2 PLOS MED. 696 (2005) [hereinafter Ioannidis, Research Findings] (theorizing the
irreproducibility of clinical trials for popular drugs); John P.A. Ioannidis, Contradicted and
Initially Stronger Effects in Highly Cited Clinical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 218 (2005)
[hereinafter Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects] (examining the irreproducibility of certain highprofile drugs and clinical studies); John P.A. Ioannidis, Evangelina E. Ntzani, Thomas A.
Trikalinos & Despina G. Contopoulous-Ioannidis, Replication Validity of Genetic Association
Studies, 29 NATURE GENETICS 306 (2001) [hereinafter Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity]
(assessing the same for genetic studies); Joseph Lau, John P.A. Ioannidis & Christopher H.
Schmid, Summing Up Evidence: One Answer Is Not Always Enough, 351 LANCET 123 (1998)
(describing the need for multiple studies to assess reproducibility for patented drugs); Jeffrey T.
Leek & Roger D. Peng, P Values Are Just the Tip of the Iceberg, 520 NATURE 612 (2015)
(recounting the difficulties in using certain statistical measures for biomedical research); Donald
W. Light & Joel Lexchin, Why Do Cancer Drugs Get Such an Easy Ride?, 350 BMJ h2068 (2015)
(examining the role of irreproducibility in patented cancer drugs).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (“[C]ompliance with
section 112 . . . is not directed to the existence of usefulness but to what an inventor must disclose
as the quid pro quo for patent protection.”).
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doctrine of enablement canonically requires patents “to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use” the
invention.12
But this distillation of enablement complicates as many issues as it
simplifies. Courts have long struggled with whether to admit evidence
arising after the application for a patent to demonstrate its
enablement—or lack thereof—at the time of its application.13 Courts
have also had difficulty measuring the breadth of the doctrine: whether
it applies to the full scope of a patent’s claims—the metes and bounds
of the patent grant—or merely a subset.14 And the doctrine seems to
be confusingly intertwined with another patent law doctrine—utility—
that only appears to overlap in narrow cases.15 Consequently, patent
law’s enablement doctrine has failed to address how to treat follow-on,
validating research; it is unclear whether such studies can be used as
evidence in enablement disputes. And even if they can, courts have
struggled to align follow-on research to claim language, utility
concerns, and shifting clinical paradigms.
These problems highlight the difference between science’s
dynamism—its continuous resolution of prior inconsistencies—and
patents’ static nature. The ability to replicate previous results to
determine their veracity—scientific reproducibility—makes the canon
of scientific knowledge, unlike patent law, an ever-moving target.16 In
particular, several major investigations have found that many large and

12. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
13. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083,
1098–105 (2009) (discussing this difficulty concerning unforeseeable “after-arising” technology);
Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2005) (“On the question
of whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time of the
invention, the contradictions are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder
can reach toward later inventions.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning of Patent Claim
Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 106–07 (2005) (discussing several cases in which claim terms
appear to have changed due to later scientific advances).
14. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359, 1378 (2014)
(describing this difficulty as “unworkable”).
15. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(merging the two doctrines where the patent described a “nonsensical” method of operation).
16. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 111 (3d ed. 1996)
(describing normal science as a series of ever-moving “paradigm shifts”); POPPER, supra note 4,
at 281 (“Science never pursues the illusory aim of making its answers final, or even probable. Its
advance is, rather, towards an infinite yet attainable aim: that of ever discovering new, deeper,
and more general problems, and of subjecting our ever tentative answers to ever renewed and
ever more rigorous tests.”).
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expensive clinical research efforts are, in fact, irreproducible.17 This is
particularly problematic for new drugs, where studies mandated—and
approved—by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have
later been cast into doubt.18 This has led even the most ardent
advocates of administrative-agency-supported science to concede the
“troubling frequency of published reports that claim a significant
result, but fail to be reproducible.”19
Patent law’s lack of concern for reproducibility has therefore had
a pernicious effect on the reproducibility of clinical research. Because
patent law places time constraints on delaying patent applications,
pharmaceutical developers have powerful incentives to apply for
patents early, on little and irreproducible data.20 This, in turn, has
encouraged pharmaceutical developers to structure their clinical trials
around indications that fall within their patents’ claims, even if such
claims cannot be reproduced or are clinically meaningless.21 Several
blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and Avastin—highlight
these difficulties. In each case, the early patenting of the drug, on
demonstrably irreproducible data, drove the developer to structure
clinical trials for indications that were later withdrawn after coming
under FDA scrutiny.22 This incentive to rush to both the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) and the FDA bears significant social
costs: it motivates pharmaceutical manufacturers to develop easily

17. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612–13; Downing et al., supra note 9, at 372–76; Easton
et al., supra note 9, at 2243; Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218; Ioannidis et al.,
Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696; Lau,
Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123; Leek & Peng, supra note 9, at 612; Randall J. LeVeque,
Ian M. Mitchell & Victoria Stodden, Reproducible Research for Scientific Computing: Tools and
Strategies for Changing the Culture, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, July/Aug. 2005, at 13;
Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 5–15; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on
Data and Code Sharing, Reproducible Research, COMPUTING SCI. & ENGINEERING, Sept./Oct.
2010, at 8; Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068.
18. See, e.g., Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 220–23 (describing forty-five
such studies, including tamoxifen, enalapril, and pravastin).
19. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612.
20. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
65, 93–96 (2009) (describing the downsides of early patent filing).
21. Cf. Tito Fojo & David R. Parkinson, Biologically Targeted Cancer Therapy and Marginal
Benefits: Are We Making Too Much of Too Little or Are We Achieving Too Little by Giving Too
Much?, 16 CLINICAL CANCER RES. 5972, 5973 (2010) (criticizing the FDA approval process for
narrow therapies of patented medications); Tito Fojo & Christine Grady, How Much Is Life
Worth: Cetuximab, Non–Small Cell Lung Cancer, and the $440 Billion Question, 101 J. NAT’L
CANCER INST. 1044, 1045 (2009) (questioning the clinical meaningfulness of patented cetuximab).
22. See infra Part III.B.
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patentable, often futile drugs;23 it furthers secrecy in clinical trials;24 and
it dissuades competitors from researching alternative uses to known,
patented therapeutics.25 For cancer drugs in particular, this disconnect
between easy patenting and difficult clinical trials has encouraged drug
manufacturers to develop weak but easily patentable and approvable
treatments over more difficult cures and preventative therapeutics.26 A
recent study in the American Economic Review calculated the
monetary and human cost in this shift: “890,000 lost lifeyears . . . [valued] on the order of $89 billion.”27
Ultimately, this tension between the enablement doctrine and
scientific advancement illuminates several scholarly debates
concerning patents as a quid pro quo of property for progress. First, it
strongly suggests that enablement should take into account afterarising evidence. Patents with claims that are later to be found to be
nakedly irreproducible simply do not enable others to “make and use”
them—nor did they at the time the patent was filed. Invalidating claims
like these should not turn on whether a follow-on study was published
after a patent application was filed. Rather, they should rest on what
the after-arising data mean about the invention at the time the
invention was created. Relatedly, this suggests that technology-specific
effects in patent law can be a normative good.28 Holding
pharmaceutical patents to a higher enablement standard, for example,
may encourage better preclinical trials or may shift drug developers’
research priorities to longer-term, more statistically robust projects.
Second, this tension demonstrates patents’ limits as vehicles of useful
scientific disclosure. Despite some scholars’ advocacy for patents as

23. Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 8, at 2077 (discussing tamoxifen); Fojo & Grady,
supra note 21, at 1045 (discussing cetuximab).
24. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. TELECOMM.
TECH. L. REV. 345, 382–83 (2007).
25. See id. at 370; Anna B. Laakmann, A Property Theory of Medical Innovation, 56
JURIMETRICS J. 117, 157–58 (2016). Laakman states:
Firms generally refrain from developing unpatentable inventions, and manufacturers
stand to gain little from performing risky, rigorous clinical trials to study off-label uses
of licensed drugs. Inherent drawbacks of relying on current market-based mechanisms
to encourage the production of this type of information resource make it an attractive
target for policy intervention.
Id. (footnote omitted).
26. Budish, Roin & Williams, supra note 8, at 2049.
27. Id.
28. Contra Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1616–30 (2003).
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fonts of scientific information,29 it seems clear that patents, especially
for complex or statistically bound inventions, routinely disclose
information that does not meet the strictures of scientific publishing.
And third, framing enablement as incongruent with scientific norms
suggests an easy distinction between the oft-confused enablement and
utility doctrines: claims that are mathematically or physically
impossible fail for a lack of utility; claims that are proven wrong or
overbroad by a later statistical analysis should fail for a lack of
enablement.
Part I of this Article examines the norm and importance of
reproducibility in science, as well as recent concerns over
irreproducibility, especially in the context of clinical trials. Part II
reviews patent law’s doctrine of enablement, and its difficulties, with
respect to reproducibility. Part III then examines the intersection
between enablement and irreproducibility in the context of
pharmaceutical patents. It analyzes pharmaceutical developers’
incentives to file patents based on irreproducible data. It describes four
such cases, all for blockbuster drugs—Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and
Avastin. And it also details some of the social costs of such a system.
Lastly, Part IV explains how this Article resolves several current
scholarly debates over the role of enablement and disclosure in the
patent system.
I. SCIENTIFIC IRREPRODUCIBILITY
A. The Importance of Reproducibility in Science
Ideally, science proceeds by hypothesis testing—by generating
hypotheses about natural phenomena and subjecting those hypotheses
to rigorous testing.30 When testing conclusively confirms or refutes a
hypothesis being investigated, scientists will then often report on their
findings and subject their report to “peer review,” an assessment by

29. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
621, 624 (2010).
30. POPPER, supra note 4, at 9. Popper writes:
From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation,
a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means
of logical deduction. . . . [T]here is the testing of the theory by way of empirical
applications of the conclusions which can be derived from it. The purpose of this last
kind of test is to find out how far the new consequences of the theory—whatever may
be new in what it asserts—stand up to the demands of practice, whether raised by
purely scientific experiments, or by practical technological applications.
Id.
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other peer scientists of the testing design, the conduct of the
experiments, and the conclusions drawn by the original investigator.31
Once a report survives peer review—arguably the superlative standard
in scientific publishing32—other scientists can then adopt and
internalize the report’s findings.33 Future scientists may then use the
information validated in the original report to generate new
hypotheses and to subject those hypotheses to tests, reporting, peer
review, and so on. In this way, science carefully and incrementally
advances.34
In reality, however, science does not ossify around past
publications.35 The skepticism inherent in the scientific method that
gives rise to experimentalism and peer review also engenders a
ceaseless drive for certainty, even with otherwise strong confirming
evidence.36 In that spirit, scientists often attempt to replicate each
other’s experiments—both to generate hypotheses of their own and

31. ADIL E. SHAMOO & DAVID B. RESNIK, RESPONSIBLE CONDUCT OF RESEARCH 69–70
(2d ed. 2009) (discussing the components of successful collaboration among scientists).
32. J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, In Defense of Regulatory Peer Review, 84 WASH. U. L. REV.
1, 6 (2006) (“Peer review is commonplace, indeed, fundamental, to the practice of science. It is
the gold standard for determining publication and general acceptance of scientific research.”).
33. Effie J. Chan, Note, The “Brave New World” of Daubert: True Peer Review, Editorial
Peer Review, and Scientific Validity, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 100, 114 (1995) (“Scientific progress results
when a claim is repeatedly confirmed by the testing of true peer review. . . . It becomes part of the
fund of scientific knowledge from which further scientific advances may be made.”).
34. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1055 (1989). Eisenberg states:
[F]ree access promotes scientific progress by permitting other scientists to use prior
discoveries in subsequent research. . . . It may be that most if not all new discoveries
build upon prior discoveries, and that scientists therefore need to use prior discoveries
in order to advance the state of scientific knowledge.
Id.
35. See LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS: TOWARDS A THEORY OF
SCIENTIFIC GROWTH 25 (1977). Laudan asserts:
One of the richest and healthiest dimensions of science is the growth through time of
the standards it demands for something to count as a solution to a problem. What one
generation of scientists will accept as a perfectly adequate solution will often be viewed
by the next generation as a hopelessly inadequate one.
Id.
36. See Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility, 450 NATURE 33, 33 (2007). Jasanoff states:
The great mystery of modernity is that we think of certainty as an attainable state.
Uncertainty has become the threat to collective action, the disease that knowledge
must cure. It is the condition that poses cruel dilemmas for decision-makers; that must
be reduced at any cost; that is tamed with scenarios and assessments; and that feeds the
frenzy for new knowledge, much of it scientific.
Id.
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also to provide a further check on the peer-review process.37 The
success or failure of these attempts to replicate prior results is often
measured as a study’s “reproducibility”: whether a published
experiment is, in fact, reproducible by an independent group of
researchers.38 If a research result is not reproducible—if other
investigators cannot obtain the same results as the original
investigators, using the same methods—there is good reason to doubt
the original result even if the prior work was subjected to the peerreview process.39 In this way, science is largely self-correcting: “[E]rrors
are systematically criticized and fairly often, in time, corrected.”40
There are countless ways for scientific experiments to fail. And
there are myriad ways to assess experiments’ reproducibility. Recently,
Victoria Stodden has categorized the facets of reproducibility into
three groups: empirical reproducibility, statistical reproducibility, and
computational reproducibility.41 Empirical reproducibility is the
classical kind: whether, given enough information about an
experiment’s conditions, parameters, and equipment, an independent
researcher can obtain the same results as those previously published.42
Concerns over this sort of reproducibility date back to at least the
seventeenth century, arising from a dispute between Christiaan
Huygens and Robert Hooke over the suspension, or lack thereof, of
expurgated water in glass columns.43 Statistical reproducibility, by
contrast, concerns whether an experiment can be repeated with the
same degree of statistical certainty as its predecessor, or whether the
conclusions of the original study’s authors were statistically sound.44
Errors in the application of certain statistical methods, data collection,
37. See COLLINS, supra note 4, at 29–50 (discussing the role of replication in scientific
practice). But see Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1049–51 (describing the lack of practical incentives
for replication studies).
38. See Victoria Stodden, Reproducibility, in THIS IDEA MUST DIE: SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
THAT ARE BLOCKING PROGRESS 529, 529–31 (John Brockman ed., 2015).
39. See Bruce Alberts et al., Self-Correction in Science at Work, 348 SCIENCE 1420, 1420–22
(2015) (discussing reproducibility as science’s “[s]elf-correction” mechanism).
40. Id. at 1420 (quoting KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH
OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 293 (1963)).
41. Stodden, supra note 38, at 529–31.
42. Id. at 529.
43. ROBERT D. PURRINGTON, THE FIRST PROFESSIONAL SCIENTIST: ROBERT HOOKE AND
THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON 48–50 (Eberhard Knobloch, Helge Kragh & Erhard Scholz
eds., 2009) (describing the resolution of Huygens’s and Hooke’s conflicting experiments in the
1660s as the driver for the Royal Society’s focus on reproducibility); see also Stodden, supra note
38, at 529.
44. Stodden, supra note 38, at 531.
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and sample sizes, for example, can generate statistically irreproducible
results.45 Computational reproducibility is a more modern concern:
whether, given “changes in scientific practice and reporting standards
to accommodate the use of computational technology . . . the same
results can be obtained from the data and code used in the original
study.”46 An increasing number of scientific disciplines—for example,
meteorology, astronomy, and molecular biology—rely on code to test
hypotheses and generate results. Understanding and being able to use
that code has become critical in ascertaining whether previously
published results are, in fact, reproducible.47
No matter the label, “[t]he ability of other investigators to
replicate the experiments by following the method in the published
report is crucial to the advancement of science.”48 It is “the touchstone
of the scientific method and one of the strongest norms of the research
community.”49
B

Recent Concerns over Irreproducibility

Recently, several researchers, including the former director of the
NIH, Francis S. Collins, voiced their concerns that many peerreviewed, published scientific studies were irreproducible—or, at the
very least, not replicable.50 Although outright fraud was extremely
rare—only twelve cases in 2011 out of thousands of studies
performed51—Collins and Lawrence A. Tabak, the principal deputy
director of the NIH, attributed this crisis in reproducibility to “a
complex array of other factors”:
[P]oor training of researchers in experimental design; increased
emphasis on making provocative statements rather than presenting

45. Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 2–4.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing, supra note 17, at 8 (“Massive
computation is transforming science. This is clearly evident from highly visible launches of largescale data mining and simulation projects such as those in climate change prediction, galaxy
formation and biomolecular modeling.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
48. SHAMOO & RESNIK, supra note 31, at 51.
49. Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 109.
50. E.g., Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612; Downing et al., supra note 9, at 368; Easton
et al., supra note 9, at 2243; Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218; Ioannidis et al.,
Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696; Lau,
Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123; Leek & Peng, supra note 9, at 612; LeVeque et al., supra
note 17, at 13; Stodden, supra note 4, at 1; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing,
supra note 17, at 8; Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068.
51. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612.
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technical details; and publications that do not report basic elements
of experimental design. Crucial experimental design elements that
are all too frequently ignored include blinding, randomization,
replication, sample-size calculation and the effect of sex differences.
And some scientists reputedly use a ‘secret sauce’ to make their
experiments work—and withhold details from publication or describe
them only vaguely to retain a competitive edge.52

Other researchers have examined these factors in depth. In a
famous 2005 article, Why Most Published Research Findings Are False,
John P.A. Ioannidis claimed, “[F]alse findings may be the majority or
even the vast majority of published research claims.”53 Ioannidis’s
article criticized the lack of attention paid to experimental design and
attempted to calculate how researcher bias—both statistical and
psychological—contributed to such failures.54 The article developed
metrics for assessing a given study’s “pre-study odds”55—the likelihood
that a study will yield true or reproducible results given its
design—with its “positive predictive value” (PPV)—the likelihood that
a study is true given the results it generated.56 Studies with good
experimental designs that yield narrow, powerful results are likely to
be reproducible. Studies with poor experimental design that yield
fantastical results are likely to be just that—fantastical.57 After
assessing various types of studies, Ioannidis concluded that, generally,
“a PPV exceeding 50% is quite difficult to get.”58 In some types of
studies, such as “[d]iscovery-oriented exploratory research with
massive testing,” Ioannidis calculated the PPV to be 0.1 percent.59 In
other words, each result in such a study is likely to be irreproducible
99.9 percent of the time.60
Some of the biases studied by Ioannidis focused on the tools of
statistical inquiry themselves.61 Researchers’ reliance on one such tool,

52. Id. (footnotes omitted).
53. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 697–98.
56. Id. at 696.
57. Id. at 700.
58. Id. at 699.
59. Id. at 700 (calculating the PPV to be 0.1 percent).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 696–97 (discussing the statistical measurements of error, power, and significance);
see also Stodden, Reproducing Statistical Results, supra note 4, at 1 (discussing statistical
irreproducibility).
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statistical significance (p), has raised some particularly thorny issues of
reproducibility. A 1998 study criticized the use of p-values in metaanalyses of clinical trials.62 The measurement failed to take into
account the heterogeneity of multiple studies, the studies’ differences
in sample sizes, or certain random effects present in each study.63 This
reliance on p-values cast doubt on the studies’ claims to causality and
universality—in other words, the ability of future studies to reproduce
the results seen in the aggregate.64 A similar practice, “p-hacking,”
involves measuring different combinations of variables in the hope that
one combination will produce statistically significant results—with
reproducibility often a victim.65 And at its most extreme, researchers’
reliance on p-values has had the effect of creating competing,
contradicted studies—later findings that came to the opposite
conclusions of their predecessors.66
Stephen T. Ziliak and Deirdre N. McCloskey have controversially
derided this reliance on p-values as “the cult of p.”67 Even the Supreme
Court—a court of law, not of math—has cast doubt on p’s importance.
In Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,68 the Court allowed
shareholders of a drug manufacturer to pursue their securities claims
against the company concerning its alleged misrepresentation of its
drug’s side effects.69 The Court rejected the company’s defense that the
lack of statistical significance between ingesting the drug and its side
effects meant that such complications were merely “anecdotal.”70 “This

62. Lau, Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 125.
63. Id. at 124–26.
64. Id. at 125.
65. Regina Nuzzo, Statistical Errors, 506 NATURE 150, 150–52 (2014) (describing one
instance of p-hacking). For a general overview and estimation of the practice, see generally Megan
L. Head et al., The Extent and Consequences of P-Hacking in Science, PLOS BIOLOGY, Mar. 13
2015, at 1. For a humorous overview of the practice in clinical health studies, see Last Week
Tonight with John Oliver: Scientific Studies (HBO television broadcast May 8, 2016).
66. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223–26 (discussing the factors that
contribute to contradicted findings).
67. STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE: HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 9 (2008).
68. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
69. Id. at 30–31.
70. Id. at 39–40 (“Absent statistical significance, Matrixx argues, adverse event reports
provide only ‘anecdotal’ evidence that ‘the user of a drug experienced an adverse event at some
point during or following the use of that drug.’” (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 17, Matrix x
Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011) (No. 09-1156))).
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premise is flawed,” concluded the Court, for many of the same reasons
researchers have come to criticize the measurement.71
Irreproducibility also stems from what Collins and Tabak dub the
“secret sauce,” where researchers “withhold details from publication
or describe them only vaguely to retain a competitive edge.”72 One
medical
diagnostics
company,
Theranos,
attempted—and
spectacularly failed—to bank on this asymmetry, by trying to protect
its methods and results as trade secrets rather than subjecting its
products to peer review or disclosing them in patents.73 Researchers
criticized the company for engaging in “stealth research,” where there
was little hope of having “its methods and technologies scrutinized and
validated by independent scientists.”74 Indeed, it took a
comprehensive, long-term investigation by Wall Street Journal reporter
John Carreyrou to find that many of Theranos’s test results—some of
which appeared fraudulent—could not be reproduced by goldstandard, hospital-grade laboratory tests.75
In other instances, reproducibility appears impossible because
researchers simply refuse to adequately disclose their methods in
obtaining computational results.76 In the precision-medicine context—
where scientists attempt to link individual genetic variations to
disease—clinicians often rely on “opaque computational models to

71. See id. at 40 (discussing the impossibility of obtaining statistically significant
measurements for small samples, alternatives to statistical significance for expert testimony on
causation, and the FDA’s use of statistical significance—or lack thereof—for postmarket
surveillance of approved drugs).
72. Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 612 (footnote omitted).
73. John P.A. Ioannidis, Stealth Research: Is Biomedical Innovation Happening Outside the
Peer-Reviewed Literature?, 313 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 663, 663 (2015).
74. Id. at 664.
75. See John Carreyrou, Hot Startup Theranos Has Struggled with Its Blood-Test Technology,
WALL STREET J. (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/theranos-has-struggledwith-blood-tests-1444881901 [https://perma.cc/EFJ4-P579]. John Carreyrou’s investigation into
Theranos’s reproducibility issues and corporate behavior has been a saga unto itself. His work on
the Theranos case led the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to propose sanctions on
the company for misbehavior. Letter from Karen Fuller, Manager, State Oversight and CLIA
Branch, Div. of Survey and Certification, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Sunil Dhawan,
Dir., Elizabeth Holmes, Owner, and Ramesh Balwani, President, Theranos, Inc. (Mar. 18, 2016),
http://www.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/hhslettertheranos.pdf [https://perma.cc/LPF77JBS]. This reporting garnered Carreyrou the 2015 George Polk Award for Financial Reporting.
Press Release, Long Island Univ., Long Island University Announces 67th Annual George Polk
Awards in Journalism (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.liu.edu/~/link.aspx?_id=125E54C4CDB14A2
E87A9C305A390C0F8&_z=z [https://perma.cc/6UFP-YVEP].
76. Victoria Stodden, Trust Your Science? Open Your Data and Code, 2011 AMSTAT NEWS
21, 21; Yale Law Sch. Roundtable on Data and Code Sharing, supra note 17, at 8.
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make decisions related to health care,” what W. Nicholson Price II calls
“black-box medicine.”77 “Secrecy, however, is a problematic incentive
for the datasets underpinning the development of black-box medicine
and makes method validation impossible.”78 Without external
validation, any scientific finding using these models simply “retains
whatever biases or errors may have created problems in the first
place.”79 And disconcertingly, “the FDA currently lacks the expertise
and resources to independently replicate a company’s algorithmic
results.”80
Even when innovative companies do seek out patents on
their work—and, consequently, disclose their methods to the
public—follow-on researchers have no greater guarantee that the most
important aspects of those companies’ data will be reproducible.
Myriad Genetics, for example, patented two genes related to breast
cancer risk, BRCA1 and BRCA2, as well as methods of testing them,
before having such patents struck down by the Supreme Court.81 But
Myriad kept—and continues to keep—a secret database of numerous
variants of those genes in an attempt to command a competitive
advantage over its rivals; by having a robust yet confidential database
of these “variants of unknown significance,” Myriad hopes to attract
clinicians’ business.82 Secrecy of this sort is simply “not independently
verifiable or replicable.”83 In this way, companies have used patent
protection—with its traditional celebration of disclosure—as little
more than leverage to protect secret and potentially irreproducible
technology.84
These concerns with irreproducibility in scientific research are not
just limited to problems in methodology. In some instances, the
sensitivities of researchers’ physical tools are to blame. One study
blamed poor materials as the culprit behind over a third of
77. W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 421 (2015).
78. Id. at 447.
79. Id. at 441.
80. Id. at 442.
81. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2120 (2013).
82. John M. Conley, Robert Cook-Deegan & Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, Myriad After Myriad:
The Proprietary Data Dilemma, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 597, 613–16 (2014).
83. Id. at 635.
84. Dan L. Burk, Patents as Data Aggregators in Personalized Medicine, 21 B.U. J. SCI. TECH.
L. 233, 239–240 (2015); Jacob S. Sherkow & Christopher Scott, Myriad Stands Alone, 32 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 620, 620 (2014) (discussing Myriad’s patents as forming its secret database).
Brenda M. Simon & Ted M. Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2753547 [https://perma.cc/A3X8-PRY5].
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irreproducible studies.85 Antibodies—the workhorses of molecular
biology, molecules thought capable of uniquely pairing to a single other
molecule—have also recently been blamed for a rash of irreproducible
studies.86 Improper use or characterization of antibodies can cause
them to react with unintended molecules, resulting in both false
positive and false negative results.87 In other cases, manufacturing
variability within a single batch of antibodies can yield different results
across different conditions.88 And even using “good” antibodies, slight
changes in experimental conditions can move the needle on certain
results.89 This has led several researchers to speculate that, at least in
part, “antibodies are a major driver of what has been deemed a
‘reproducibility crisis,’ a growing realization that the results of many
biomedical experiments cannot be reproduced and that the conclusions
based on them may be unfounded.”90
C. Irreproducibility in Clinical Trials
Although irreproducibility has the potential to threaten all areas
of the scientific endeavor, it seems particularly poignant in biomedical
research—and for clinical trials in particular.91 News reports have
recently focused on one study that claimed that “[s]cientists in the
United States spend $28 billion each year on basic biomedical research

85. Monya Baker, Irreproducible Biology Research Costs Put at $28 Billion Per Year,
NATURE: NEWS, (June 9, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/irreproducible-biology-researchcosts-put-at-28-billion-per-year-1.17711 [https://perma.cc/K4XR-969C] [hereinafter Baker,
Irreproducible Biology Research] (“Overall, the team found that poor materials made the largest
contribution to reproducibility problems, at 36% . . . .”).
86. Monya Baker, Blame It on the Antibodies, 521 NATURE 274, 274 (2015) [hereinafter
Baker, Antibodies].
87. See id. at 275–76.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 274.
91. Id.; Collins & Tabak, supra note 1, at 613 (“The recent evidence showing the
irreproducibility of significant numbers of biomedical-research publications demands immediate
and substantive action.”); Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 700 (“As shown, the
majority of modern biomedical research is operating in areas with very low pre- and post- study
probability for true findings.”); Baker, Irreproducible Biology Research, supra note 85, at 1;
Jocelyn Kaiser, Study Claims $28 Billion a Year Spent on Irreproducible Biomedical Research,
SCIENCE (June 9, 2015, 1:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/06/study-claims-28billion-year-spent-irreproducible-biomedical-research [https://perma.cc/ZXC7-5CAS] (“An eyepopping $28 billion is spent in the United States each year on preclinical research that can’t be
reproduced by other researchers. That’s the conclusion of a provocative analysis published today
in part by economists who based it on past studies of error rates in biomedical studies.”)
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that cannot be repeated successfully.”92 The study examined other
reports of irreproducibility in an attempt to characterize and quantify
their causes, finding that roughly 50 percent of all preclinical cancer
studies contained at least one irreproducible result.93 Given that the
United States spends roughly $56 billion each year on such studies, this
amounted, in the authors’ view, to close to $28 billion of waste.94
Economics aside, other investigators have delivered damning sermons
about reproducibility in biomedical studies, with one report claiming
that “47 of 53 landmark cancer research papers could not be
reproduced.”95 Some have focused on irreproducibility as a function of
the incentive structure of biomedical research, noting that “[c]onflicts
of interest are very common in biomedical research,
and . . . inadequately and sparsely reported.”96 And yet others have
pointed to irreproducibility as a symptom of declining morale among
biomedical researchers faced with daunting career challenges and, for
academic researchers, faced with tenure pressures.97
Clinical trials—studies of new drugs or devices to determine their
safety and efficacy—seem particularly prone to claims of
irreproducibility. Clinical trials often suffer from many of the ills that
were found by Ioannidis to give rise to irreproducible results, including
small sample sizes, small effects, a larger number of tested variables,
an increasing flexibility in design, a greater potential for conflicts of
interest, and a higher quotient of competitive popularity.98 One
analysis of forty-nine “highly cited original clinical research studies”
found that seven of the follow-on studies—16 percent—wholly
contradicted their earlier studies’ findings.99 In one particularly
egregious example, a 1991 clinical trial claimed that postmenopausal
women receiving hormone replacement therapy were 44 percent less
susceptible to coronary artery disease.100 A 2002 follow-up trial
concluded, much to the contrary, that hormone replacement therapy

92. Baker, Irreproducibility Biology Research, supra note 85, at 1.
93. Freedman et al., supra note 2, at 3.
94. Id.
95. Baker, Antibodies, supra note 86, at 275.
96. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 698.
97. See Alberts et al., supra note 39, at 1421.
98. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98.
99. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218.
100. See id. at 223 n.13 (citing Meir J. Stampfer et al., Post-Menopausal Estrogen Therapy and
Cardiovascular Disease: Ten-Year Follow-Up from the Nurses’ Health Study, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 756 (1991) [hereinafter Nurses’ Health Study]).
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was responsible for a 29 percent increase in coronary artery disease.101
Even where follow-on clinical trials do not contradict their
predecessors, they may find no evidence to support the original study’s
results, or find that the level of effect reported by the previous study
was, in fact, substantially incorrect. Of the same forty-nine original
clinical research studies, four found little evidence to verify the original
clinical trials’ claims, while another seven concluded that the original
study found substantially higher efficacy than warranted.102 In all,
eighteen of the forty-nine clinical trials, or 36.7 percent, could not be
reproduced.103 Perhaps equally concerning is that, to date, eleven of the
original forty-nine clinical trials have yet to be challenged in any way.104
Because clinical trials are almost always conducted for the purpose
of receiving FDA approval to market a particular therapy, some of
these failures in reproducibility stem from the agency’s standards for
clinical trials.105 An exhaustive 2014 study that revisited the clinical trial
data for all new drugs approved by the FDA from 2005 to 2012
concluded that “[t]he quality of clinical trial evidence used by the FDA
as the basis for recent approvals of novel therapeutic agents varied
widely across indications.”106 Some of this flexibility is the product of
necessity; “A perfect gold standard is not possible in clinical
research.”107 Some may even “be warranted given the limited number
of effective therapies and the poor prognosis associated with [diseases
like] cancer.”108

101. Id. at 223 n.44 (discussing Writing Grp. for the Women’s Health Initiative Investigators,
Risks and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women: Principal
Results from the Women’s Health Initiative Randomized Controlled Trial, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
321 (2002) [hereinafter Women’s Health Initiative Study]). Perhaps unsurprisingly, this seventythree-percentage-point swing resulted in a substantial products-liability lawsuit against the
therapy’s manufacturer, Wyeth Pharmaceuticals. See Tobias Millrood, The Rise and Fall of
Hormone Therapy, TRIAL, Aug. 2003, at 43–47 (describing class action litigation that resulted
from health risks associated with the drug Prempro).
102. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 222.
103. Id. This can be calculated by adding the number of clinical trials where later research has
demonstrated a contradicted effect (seven), no effect (four), or a substantially diminished effect
(seven).
104. Id. at 218.
105. Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal Standard, 70 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 2073, 2093–95 (2013) (discussing the deficiencies in the FDA’s standards for clinical
trials).
106. Downing et al., supra note 9, at 368.
107. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 224.
108. Downing et al., supra note 9, at 373.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

PATENT LAW’S REPRODUCIBILITY PARADOX

863

Nonetheless, several of the measurements allowed by the FDA to
prove efficacy are particularly suspect. The use of surrogate rather than
clinical end points—for example, measures of disease progression like
the size of patients’ tumors as opposed to patients’ ultimate survival
rates—stands out as a significant source of irreproducibility.109 “This
reliance on surrogate outcomes leaves patients and physicians to
extrapolate clinical benefits from trials, again raising questions about
the certainty of the medications’ benefits in practice,”110 that is, that
such results are not, in fact, real. Even clinical trials that do measure
clinical end points like survival times often suffer from low effect sizes,
a hallmark of irreproducible results.111 In the cancer context, subjects
for seventy-one solid-tumor drugs approved by the FDA from 2002 to
2014 improved their life span, at median, by only two-and-a-half
months.112 Genetic-association studies—studies attempting to link an
individual’s risk of developing a genetic disease, such as cancer, with a
particular genetic variation—suffer from low effect sizes as well. What
is more, attempts to replicate even successful studies have been met
with skepticism if not outright backlash.113
A lack of statistical power—the capacity of a study to detect the
effect of a change on a studied population—appears to be another
significant cause of irreproducible results in clinical studies. A 2001
study of thirty-six genetic disease associations found that “[o]ften
genetic associations of disease are of modest magnitude . . . and single
studies are underpowered to detect them.”114 This lack of power
contributed to the irreproducibility of prior studies linking certain gene
variants to schizophrenia, dementia, hypertension, Parkinson disease,
lung cancer, alcoholism, diabetic nephropathy, and others.115 Another

109. Id. at 374.
110. Id.
111. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697 (“The smaller the effect sizes in a
scientific field, the less likely the research findings are to be true.”).
112. Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068 (“The 71 drugs approved by the FDA from 2002
to 2014 for solid tumours have resulted in median gains in progression-free and overall survival
of only 2.5 and 2.1 months, respectively.” (footnote omitted)). A similar subset of drugs approved
by the European Medicines Agency found only a one-and-a-half-month gain. Id. (“A review of
drugs for solid cancers approved by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) in its first 10 years
found that, overall, new oncology drugs improved survival by a mean and median of 1.5 and 1.2
months, respectively.” (footnote omitted)).
113. See Kaiser, supra note 91 (describing efforts to replicate successful studies that have been
met with skepticism).
114. Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 308.
115. Id. at 307. The authors note:
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study of commercially available multigene diagnostic tests casts doubt
on the linkages between over a dozen genes analyzed by such services
and cancer risk.116 Of the eleven commercial tests analyzed, every one
tested for at least one such dubious genetic variant.117
And yet, even when clinical trials meet the “gold standard” in
terms of experimental design and predictive power,118 there is little
guarantee that future trials will be able to reproduce their results.
Jonathan J. Darrow has noted that “the statistical framework
supporting the gold standard does not account for the possibility that
drug companies may undertake multiple trials until one or more of
them demonstrates efficacy.”119 Furthermore, even the gold standard
is, itself, “inadequate because its statistical framework requires no
particular level of efficacy.”120 In other words, even new drug
applicants who adhere to the gold standard to conduct clinical trials are
still free to employ a spaghetti-method approach to demonstrate
efficacy—where “efficacy” is “not the drug’s level of efficacy per se, but
rather the [statistical] relationship between the results from the control
group and those from the active group.”121 This nuanced form of phacking leads Darrow to conclude that the FDA’s “standard[s], along
with the related concepts of gold standard testing, statistical
significance, and clinical significance, do not prevent FDA approval of
substantially ineffective remedies.”122
Ultimately, quantifying the amount of irreproducibility in clinical
trials may simply be impossible. Not every clinical trial is validated with
Subsequent studies have failed to validate the originally proposed importance of
dopamine receptor D3 gene polymorphisms for schizophrenia, of apolipoprotein E
gene polymorphisms for dementia in patients with Down syndrome, of
angiotensinogen gene polymorphisms for essential hypertension, of cytochrome p450
2D6 (CYP2D6) gene mutations for Parkinson disease or of CYP2D6 metabolic status
for lung cancer. Subsequent studies have confirmed that glutathione S-transferase M1
status may be important in susceptibility to lung cancer, that dopamine receptor D2
gene polymorphisms may confer some susceptibility to alcoholism and that
angiotensin-converting enzyme gene polymorphisms may be involved in diabetic
nephropathy; however, the strength of the associations found by the subsequent studies
is significantly smaller than that postulated by the first studies for each of these three
subjects.
Id.
116. See Easton et al., supra note 9, at 2254.
117. Id. at 2242.
118. Darrow, supra note 105, at 2090 (enumerating several “gold standard[s]” in clinical trials:
“randomization, double-blind administration, and placebo-control”).
119. Id. at 2095.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2112.
122. Id. at 2076.
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its own follow-on study, that, in any event, may suffer from its own
deficiencies.123 Clinical trials—and even follow-on trials—are often
conducted under the guise of FDA regulations, which have an
instrumental rather than an investigatory bent.124 And new drug
applicants can often keep their most damning negative results
confidential under the FDA’s own regulations.125 As a result,
“noncommercial researchers deprived of the means to independently
re-analyze raw data cannot easily verify or refute product sponsors’
safety and efficacy claims.”126
II. IRREPRODUCIBILITY, DISCLOSURE, AND ENABLEMENT
A lack of adequate disclosure accounts for much of today’s
irreproducible research. The opacity of experimental design, the
absence of technical details, and the convolution of statistical
calculations all contribute to making follow-on research more difficult
to perform and past research difficult to verify.127 To that end, patents
may seem like a cure. Patents have long been described as a quid pro
quo: the government grants to inventors the exclusive rights to their
inventions only so long as they sufficiently disclose them.128 With an
inventor’s disclosure, the public receives the technical knowledge
contained in the patent as soon as it is published. And after the patent

123. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218.
124. Darrow, supra note 105, at 2075–76.
125. Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 382–83.
126. Laakmann, supra note 25, at 133.
127. See supra Part I.
128. The first use of “quid pro quo” to describe this disclosure requirement was likely by Chief
Judge William C. Coleman of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co. in 1950 and famously repeated ten years later by the U.S.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Nelson. Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 91 F. Supp. 218, 222 (D. Md. 1950) (“But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a
process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to practice the invention once
the period of the monopoly has expired . . . .”), with In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 184 (C.C.P.A.
1960) (“[C]ompliance with section 112 . . . is not directed to the existence of usefulness but to what
an inventor must disclose as the quid pro quo for patent protection.”). Earlier cases, however,
referred to the “quid” in the quid pro quo as the creation of something previously unknown to
the public—not necessarily fully disclosing it. See, e.g., Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 23
(1829). The Court in Pennock notes:
If the public were already in possession and common use of an invention fairly and
without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not
intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already
common. There would be no quid pro quo—no price for the exclusive right or
monopoly conferred upon the inventor for fourteen years.
Id.
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has expired, the public may then use and improve the invention
without paying a royalty.129 This incentive to transfer knowledge is—at
least, ideally—the mechanism by which patents “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts.”130
What constitutes a sufficient disclosure, however, is difficult to
gauge. A patent that no one can practice makes the disclosure
mechanism worthless—and the exclusive grant to the inventor rather
costly.131 At the same time, the lay public cannot be expected to
understand even valuable patent disclosures in highly technical
fields.132 Garage-shop tinkerers are not expected to understand patents
in the rocket sciences; rocket scientists’ patents should not be invalid
for failing to educate them.
129. See Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 1022 (“This enabling disclosure becomes freely available
to the public as soon as the patent issues; the patent holder may not thereafter monitor or control
access to it.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (“[Patent
disclosure] permits society at large to apply the information by freely making or using the
patented invention after the expiration of the patent.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) (“[T]he public benefits from the disclosure of the
invention because the public storehouse of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely
upon the teachings of the patent to generate even further, follow-on innovation.”); Seymore,
supra note 29, at 624 (“[T]he technical information disclosed in the patent document has potential
immediate value to the public, which can use the information for any purpose that does not
infringe upon the claims.” (footnote omitted)).
130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Whether this ideal holds up in practice remains controversial.
See, e.g., Burk & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1623 (explaining that secrecy, rather than disclosure,
facilitates software innovation); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of
Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 198–200 (1987) (arguing that publication
norms in scientific research facilitate disclosure more than the patent system); Katherine J.
Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 485–
88 (2008) (proposing that user-innovators’ disclosure preferences are not matched by the patent
system).
131. See Fromer, supra note 129, at 552–53. Fromer notes:
[P]atentees rationally have little to no incentive to offer more information than the
patent laws require and have an incentive to obfuscate information they provide
whenever possible. Inventors can seek to maximize their own competitive advantage
by curtailing competitors’ use of information about the invention. In this way, they can
make it harder for competitors to capitalize on the invention or related technologies,
especially when the invention is groundbreaking. . . . These effects serve to prolong the
inventors’ exclusive use, thereby enriching the original inventors.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
132. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779,
785–87 (2011) (describing the complexities—legal and technical—of disclosures in patents); Mark
D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72, 114 n.152 (2012)
(“If the law required that the general public be able to read the patent and understand the
invention based on little more than the patent document alone, every patent document would
need to be a textbook on elementary concepts in order to satisfy the disclosure requirements.”);
Seymore, supra note 29, at 624–25 (describing the patent document as a potential, and routinely
unfulfilled, source of technical information).

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

PATENT LAW’S REPRODUCIBILITY PARADOX

867

The patent statute, title 35 of the U.S. Code, has therefore crafted
the bargain that sufficient disclosures are those that “enable any person
skilled in the art to which [the patent] pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same.”133 Whether a patent
accomplishes this turns on whether a person skilled in the art would
need to engage in “undue experimentation” to practice the invention
as described.134 Distinguishing undue experimentation from the merely
routine requires an analysis of both the patent itself as well as the
relevant art: the breadth of the patent’s claims, the nature of the
invention, the state of prior art, the level of ordinary skill in the field,
the art’s predictability, the amount of direction provided in the patent’s
written description, whether any working examples exist, and the
quantity of experimentation needed to successfully practice the
invention.135 In all, enablement acts as one of “the most important
patent doctrine[s],” serving multiple functions: “adequacy of
disclosure, . . . the line of demarcation between the visionary
theorist . . . and the visionary pioneer[,] . . . [and] the boundary
between pioneer inventions and patentable improvements.”136
This doctrinal complexity, however, fails to encourage
reproducibility in patented disclosures. First, the Federal Circuit has
presented conflicting views on whether evidence obtained after a
patent application has been filed, such as follow-on research, can be
used to prove (or disprove) enablement.137 This means that advances
in science—important in verifying the research underlying a patented
invention—can only rarely be used in assessing the scientific validity of

133. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
134. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
135. Id. Notably, these factors are “illustrative, not mandatory.” Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This analysis makes “[e]nablement, while
conceptually simple . . . legally and factually complex.” Holbrook, supra note 129, at 129.
136. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J.,
dissenting); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Robert P. Merges, Opinion Letter as to the
Patentability of Certain Inventions Associated with the Identification of Partial cDNA Sequences,
23 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 38 (1995) (“Enablement is a particularly important limitation on the
patentability of prophetic claims to inventions that the applicant has not yet actually reduced to
practice.”); Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1, 13 (2012) (proposing that courts’ focus on claim language “assigns a very important role
to enablement”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1050 (2003) (calling enablement “[t]he most important
component of adequate disclosure”).
137. Compare In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(disallowing future evidence to satisfy enablement), with Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC,
435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (allowing future evidence to satisfy enablement).
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a patent’s claims.138 Second, the Federal Circuit has cobbled together a
fractured jurisprudence on the scope, and consequently the
verifiability, of the enablement determination—whether, for example,
the full scope of a patent’s claims must be enabled or only a single
embodiment.139 And third, in some instances, courts have confusingly
amalgamated some aspects of enablement with a different patent
doctrine, utility, creating a peculiar hybrid doctrine, “enablement
utility,” that weakens the relationship between disclosure and
reproducibility.140 These problems each show the difficulties in
applying the enablement doctrine to evolving information and aligning
patent law with ideals of reproducibility.
A. Postapplication Evidence for Demonstrating Enablement
There is an inherent disconnect between reproducibility and
enablement. Reproducibility looks forward, assessing whether a prior
study can be replicated in the future.141 But the “enablement
determination is made retrospectively, that is, by looking back to the
filing date of the patent application and determining whether undue
experimentation would have been required to make and use the
claimed invention at that time.”142 The PTO and federal courts do not,
in theory, account for later developments in the art that would have
enabled an otherwise defective patent application.143 This suggests that

138. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105 (discussing this difficulty concerning
unforeseeable “after-arising” technology); Feldman, supra note 13, at 16 (“On the question of
whether the definition of an invention reaches beyond the state of the art at the time of the
invention, the contradictions are most striking in the doctrines related to how far a patent holder
can reach toward later inventions.”); Lemley, supra note 13, at 106–07 (discussing several cases in
which claim terms appear to have changed due to later scientific advances).
139. Compare MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (invalidating a patent for failing to fully enable the broad scope of its claims), with
Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that the
enablement requirement is satisfied “if the description enables any mode of making and using the
claimed invention” (emphasis added)).
140. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 925–26.
141. See supra notes 30–40 and accompanying text.
142. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
143. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1087. Collins notes:
Because [after-arising technology] is by definition a technology that is not invented
until after a patent application has been filed, it is difficult to understand how a
specification can teach the [person having ordinary skill in the art] at the time of filing
how to make and use [after-arising technology]. This conceptual difficulty has created
a problem in contemporary patent law when literal claims encompass [after-arising
technology].
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enablement is, in fact, less concerned with whether an invention
actually works and more concerned with the “draftsman’s art”144 of
describing the invention as far along in the research process.
In In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation,145 for example, the
Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the plaintiffs’ patent
covering a method of treating Alzheimer’s disease using
galantamine,146 a common alkaloid extracted from various flowers.147
The patent application at issue “conclu[ded] that it was possible to
administer ‘an effective Alzheimer’s disease cognitively-enhancing
amount of galanthamine [sic]’” on the basis of “short summaries of six
scientific papers in which galantamine had been administered to
humans or animals.”148 This, the Federal Circuit concluded, was a
“mere research proposal”149 that “did not ‘teach one of skill in the art
how to use the claimed method’ because the application ‘only
surmise[d] how the claimed method could be used’ without providing
sufficient galantamine dosage information.”150 The fact that later
studies proved the inventor’s hypothesis true,151 or that the FDA
eventually approved galantamine to treat Alzheimer’s,152 was
irrelevant.
But later research that illuminates a patent’s claims is not always
irrelevant. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC,153 the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s conclusion that Eli Lilly’s patent

Id.; see Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV.
127, 142 (2008) (“[T]he Examiner cannot use a reference to show lack of enablement based on
later developments in the art.”).
144. Cf. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) (noting that the need to describe what is
being patented precedes the need to argue the discovery’s newness or obviousness).
145. In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
146. Id. at 1327–28.
147. See Michael Heinrich, Snowdrops: The Heralds of Spring and a Modern Drug for
Alzheimer’s Disease, 273 PHARMACEUTICAL J. 905, 905 (2004).
148. In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1321 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 1324.
150. Id. at 1323 (alterations in original) (quoting In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 578 F.
Supp. 2d 711, 736 (D. Del. 2008)).
151. See id. at 1328 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (“[L]ater animal studies and human clinical trials
proved and confirmed galantamine’s effectiveness.”).
152. Letter from Robert Temple, M.D., Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation I, Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, to Charles LaPree, Assistant Dir., Regulatory Affairs, Janssen Research
Found. (Feb. 28, 2001), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2001/21169ltr.
pdf [https://perma.cc/V9X2-3RPQ].
153. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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was invalid for lacking enablement.154 The patent covered a method for
treating attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) using a newly
created drug, atomoxetine.155 After a bench trial, the district court
concluded that the patent was invalid for lacking enablement: “[T]he
prior art stressed that the mechanism of action of ADHD was unclear
at the time the patent application was filed,”156 the “patent contained
no test data,”157 and clinical trials had yet to be performed.158 Even the
inventor testified at his deposition, “I wasn’t sure at all that it would
work.”159 But the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of
invalidity because “[clinical trial] data were obtained shortly after the
patent application was filed” and “experimental verification was
obtained soon after the [patent application’s] filing.”160 This odd
sequence of proof was necessary, in the appellate court’s view, because
both scientific methodology and the PTO’s examining procedures
commanded it. The former because “[s]cientific methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified.”161 And the latter because the utility of the invention was “not
so incredible as to warrant the special procedures . . . for subject matter
in once notoriously intractable [research] areas.”162
Reconciling these two cases—and developing a working standard
for when enablement can be demonstrated with postapplication
evidence—remains difficult. Indeed, it highlights the disconnect
between patent law’s enablement doctrine and standards of
reproducibility. The patents in both cases were based on thin
preclinical trial data. But in both cases, the preclinical trial data had
been verified through later, more robust clinical experiments. Yet the
different patent-validity outcomes between the two cases turned on the
courts’ interpretations of whether there existed, at the time of the

154. Id. at 927.
155. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 351–52 (D.N.J. 2010), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 435 F. App’x 917 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
156. Id. at 386.
157. Id. at 389.
158. Id. at 387–88.
159. Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 923.
160. Id. at 924.
161. Id. (quoting Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic
Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV.
643, 645 (1992)).
162. Id.
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patent applications, “a reasonable correlation between [the]
compound’s activity and its asserted therapeutic use.”163
This reasonable-correlation analysis focused not on whether the
patents’ claims were likely to be reproducible, that is, true, but instead
on whether they reasonably described a plausible therapeutic
relationship.164 This reasonable-correlation standard—however
grounded in formalistic patent doctrine—has little to commend it from
a reproducibility perspective. Even if a patent application suggests a
therapeutic correlation concerning a related but different drug than the
one claimed, one would still need to engage in burdensome
experimentation—gold-standard clinical trials—to determine whether
the claimed drug indeed works as indicated. This was evident for the
drugs in both In re ’318 Patent and Eli Lilly: the patent owners still
needed to shepherd their drugs through years of clinical trials simply
to determine whether they worked at all.165
Similarly, advances in science may change the meaning of claim
terms long after the ink has dried on the patent document.166 Courts
interpreting claim terms with a particular scientific meaning are
therefore confronted with several difficulties of time: whether to
interpret those terms at the time of the patent application, at issuance,
or after the patent has issued; whether to allow claim terms to shift
meaning from one time to another; and whether others seeking to
163. Id. at 926 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2107.03 (11th ed. 2013)
[hereinafter MPEP]) (distinguishing In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1321
(Fed. Cir. 2009)).
164. See id.
165. See In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1328 (Gajarsa, J., dissenting) (“[L]ater animal studies
and human clinical trials proved and confirmed galantamine’s effectiveness.”); Eli Lilly, 435 F.
App’x at 919–20 (recounting the clinical trial history of atomoxetine).
166. See, e.g., Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 728 F.3d 1324, 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2013) (revisiting the meaning of the term “monooxygenase”); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.,
222 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the history of IFN-α-1); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d
595, 597, 608–09 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (reversing the examiner’s rejection on the ground that the term
“normally solid homopolymer” had, since the time of filing, become indefinite); see also Dan L.
Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE
92, 95 (2013). Burk notes:
The concept of a gene is entirely a human construct, and there is considerable room for
debate as to what ought to be included in the concept of the gene, or, by the same
token, what ought to be excluded from the concept of the gene. Some such constructs
are more useful to humans than others, but the constructs themselves change over time,
resulting in what we term scientific progress—we add or revise or amend the criteria
for our constructs, subject to an array of social choices that yield amended or revised
or additional outcomes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
OF
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practice the patent would have recognized such shifts—and, if so,
when.
Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc.167 presents one of the starkest
examples of these interpretive difficulties. In 1980, the patentee in
Schering, Charles Weissmann, invented recombinant versions of a
protein then known to scientists as “interferon,” an important
component of the human body’s response to viral (and other)
infections.168 His claims were accordingly limited to recombinant
molecules of “interferon” and their attendant DNA sequences.169
Almost immediately after Weissmann applied for his patent, however,
scientific advances confirmed that what was previously known as
“interferon” was actually a collection of several proteins, later named
interferons alpha (IFN-α), beta (IFN-β), and gamma (IFN-γ). Each of
these, in turn, was comprised of various subtypes, IFN-α-1, IFN-α-2,
and so on.170 Now understanding that his recombinant protein referred
to a single one of these subtypes—IFN-α-1—Weissmann amended his
patent’s claims, changing “interferon” to “IFN-α-1.”171 In an
infringement suit between the patent’s eventual assignee, Schering
Corp., and Amgen Inc., the district court concluded that Weissmann’s
amendment “did not merely replace the outdated term ‘leukocyte
interferon.’ Rather, according to the trial court, the substitution
imported years of scientific advance into the ‘901 patent’s disclosure
and claims”—an act prohibited under the patent statute.172 Although
the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s interpretation of
Weissmann’s patent, it ultimately affirmed the district court’s finding
of noninfringement: if IFN-α-1 meant only IFN-α-1, Schering
recognized that it could not prevail at trial.173
Schering highlights several of the difficulties of assessing
enablement when courts confront claim terms with evolving scientific
meanings.174 In these evolving-meaning cases, both the district and the
appellate courts need to determine whether there is a salient difference

167. Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
168. See id. at 1349–50 (“[I]nterferons have important anti-viral and anti-tumor properties.”);
see also STEPHEN S. HALL, A COMMOTION IN THE BLOOD: LIFE, DEATH, AND THE IMMUNE
SYSTEM 131–58 (1997) (discussing the history of the discovery of interferon).
169. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1350.
170. See id. at 1349, 1352; HALL, supra note 168, at 178–208.
171. Schering, 222 F.3d at 1352.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1349.
174. See id. at 1353 (“The scientific meaning of ‘IFN-α’ evolved with new discoveries.”).
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between the disputed claim term—as used in the patent—and the term
as understood in the scientific community after the patent had been
filed. Without such a difference, the term’s definitional shift would not
appear to alter the court’s invalidity or infringement analyses. In
Schering, for example, had Weissmann’s particular use of the term
“interferon” been equivalent to his colleagues’ understanding of
“IFN-α-1,” then it would have mattered little whether a scientific
understanding of “interferon” had changed over time. This
determination is bound up with determining what aspects of the
invention the inventor possessed at the time of filing,175 an analysis
criticized by Robin Feldman as future “assumptions about how far a
particular invention can reach.”176
Courts must also determine when such a shift has occurred:
whether prior to issuance or during patent prosecution—when,
presumably, the inventor could have amended his claims—or much
later, when presumably little could be done.177 Weissmann’s
amendments in Schering were just that—amendments that he made
during the prosecution of the patent—and he was therefore bound to
the court’s ultimate infringement analysis.178 In another case, Bayer
CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC,179 the patentee had not
been so swift.180 There, the parties disputed when the patentees became
aware that their use of the term “monooxygenase” had been essentially
proven incorrect by later research.181 The Federal Circuit ultimately
held this lapse against the patent owner and affirmed the district court’s
invalidation of the patent.182 To resolve this apparent dichotomy, Mark

175. See Holbrook, supra note 129, at 132–33 (discussing the intersection of enablement and
possession).
176. Feldman, supra note 13, at 25.
177. Even after a patent issues, however, a patentee is entitled to a “reissuance” of his original
patent if, “through error, [the patent is] deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason
of a defective specification or drawing.” 35 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2012). But it is unclear whether a
scientifically evolving claim term constitutes “error,” as used in the statute. Generally speaking,
the error must be inadvertent and the new claims must limit themselves to the same invention as
the original application. See Laura A. Bauer, Modified Reissue Practice, 8 FED. CIR. B.J. 193, 195,
200–01 (1999).
178. See Schering, 222 F.3d at 1353.
179. Bayer CropScience AG v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 728 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
180. Id. at 1328–29.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1332.
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A. Lemley has strongly argued to fix these inquiries—and the meaning
of claim terms—on the date of the patent application.183
Lastly, Schering demonstrates some of the procedural difficulties
in making such nuanced assessments about the evolving scientific
meaning of claim terms. According to Lemley,
Doing so would require the scope of patents to change over time, not
only for infringement purposes . . . but also for validity
purposes. . . . Even after it issued, a patent’s scope would not be fixed,
but could differ from infringer to infringer as time passes. As a result,
the same patent could be valid at certain times and invalid at others,
depending on the meaning of terms at the time of infringement.
Further, claims valid at the time of issuance would become invalid for
lack of enablement as the meaning of those claim terms
changed. . . . No court has suggested that the meaning of patent
claims for validity purposes should be mutable over time in this way,
and the debilitating uncertainty associated with these changes
counsels against adopting it.184

Schering potentially suffered from just these sort of problems: the
changing understanding of interferons would have meant that
“IFN-α-1” took on different meanings for different defendants or that
the patent could have withstood validity challenges on some days but
not others.185 Cases like Schering ultimately show that science runs the
risk of running away with the enablement inquiry.
In this sense, the enablement doctrine, despite its nominal concern
with whether others can actually work the patented invention, fails to
properly account for a real, scientific basis that the invention actually
works. Far from being a substantive test of the workability of the
patentee’s disclosure, enablement may, like patentable subject matter,
“depend simply on the draftsman’s art.”186 The onus therefore lies on
patent attorneys to draft reasonable descriptions of plausible
183. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 115–16.
184. Id. at 116.
185. Regarding the former contention, that IFN-α-1 could have taken on different meanings
for different defendants, this was, in substance, Schering’s infringement argument at trial: that
IFN-α-1 covered a “mature” version of the protein, one made by the defendant, Amgen.
Concerning the second contention, that scientifically evolving claim terms both wax and wane a
patent’s validity, this is arguably why Schering was quick to drop its case after it lost its claimconstruction ruling—an effort to preserve its patent’s validity. See D. De. Grants Judgment to
Amgen So Opponent Can Appeal Markman Ruling, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. LITIG. REP., Apr. 5,
1999, at 9 (discussing Schering’s strategy and the district court’s dismissal of Amgen’s invalidity
counterclaim).
186. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
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therapeutic correlations between drugs and diseases, not on clinicians
to investigate them. And enablement—the seemingly best outlet for
encouraging the reproducibility of patented inventions—does very
little work itself.
B. The Scope of the Enablement Inquiry
The enablement doctrine may also discourage reproducibility in
patents for doctrinal rather than scientific reasons: the law is unclear
how much of a patent needs to be reproducible to be enabled.
Interpretations of enablement that allow some patent claims to be
reproducible—although indifferent to the remainder—invite inventors
to draft their patents to cover embodiments of their inventions that
simply cannot be reproduced. This is complicated by the Federal
Circuit’s jurisprudence on just what the enablement doctrine is meant
to cover. Although it seems clear that the enablement doctrine
operates on patents’ claims, rather than some abstract concept of “[the]
invention,”187 the Federal Circuit has been “inconsistent and chaotic”
in resolving the scope of the enablement inquiry.188 In several cases, the
court appears to have haphazardly chosen among several
irreconcilable alternatives to determine whether, and to what extent,
enablement operates on the scope of a patent’s claims.189 In an effort
to impart order on the court’s jurisprudence, Kevin Emerson Collins
has broadly grouped the court’s decisions into three doctrines: the fullscope doctrine, the single-embodiment doctrine, and the
reasonableness doctrine.190 Each of these standards has encouraged
research reproducibility differently.
The full-scope doctrine requires that a patent’s specification
enable the full scope of the patent’s claims.191 That is, the patent must
enable every potential embodiment of the invention—every way or
mechanism it can be achieved—arising from the way the claim is
drafted. This has been likened to a commensurability requirement,

187. See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Because a
patent specification must enable the full scope of a claimed invention, an enablement inquiry
typically begins with a construction of the claims.” (citations omitted)); MPEP, supra note
163, § 2164.08 (“All questions of enablement are evaluated against the claimed subject matter.”);
Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1170–71
(2014) (“[T]here is no concept of ‘the invention’ apart from the patent’s claims.”).
188. Collins, supra note 13, at 1087.
189. See id. at 1087–88.
190. Id. at 1088–89.
191. Id. at 1088.
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where the patent’s disclosure must be commensurate with the scope of
the patent’s claims.192 Under this theory, a patent that discloses
anything less than all potential embodiments for its claims is invalid.
Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories193 serves as a prime
example of the doctrine at its most forceful. In Wyeth, the patentee
claimed a method for treating restenosis, the narrowing of blood
vessels, using “rapamycin.”194 The parties disputed, however, whether
the claims’ use of the term “rapamycin” constituted a virtually limitless
class of chemicals or a well-defined set of known drugs.195 When the
court chose the former definition, it summarily invalidated the patent
for lack of enablement, concluding that “practicing the full scope of the
claims would require synthesizing and screening each of at least tens of
thousands of compounds.”196
This standard comports well with promoting reproducibility in
preclinical research. The full-scope doctrine under Wyeth seems to
encourage patent applicants to either generate enough robust evidence
to prove the veracity of broad claims—perhaps by, indeed, screening
tens of thousands of compounds—or by drafting their patents much
more narrowly, to be commensurate with the research they can, in fact,
perform. In either event, tethering enablement to a full-scope analysis
pushes researchers to one of two sides of reproducibility: either better,
more detailed preclinical research to include in broad patent
applications or narrower claims to fit narrower conclusions.
The single-embodiment doctrine, by contrast, is satisfied when the
patent specification enables a person having ordinary skill in the art to
create at least a single embodiment of the claimed invention.197 In
Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc.,198 the Federal Circuit concluded

192. See, e.g., In re Wands, 858 F.3d 731, 741 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he claims must be
commensurate with the inventor’s contribution.”); Collins, supra note 13, at 1086 (“More
specifically, enablement employs the concept of commensurability to restrict claim scope: it
mandates that the set of the technologies described by a claim remain commensurate with the set
of technologies enabled by the disclosure.” (footnote omitted)); Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 1534
(“[C]ommensurability between claim scope and disclosure . . . is understood to be a part of the
enablement requirement in patent law.”); Seymore, supra note 29, at 634 (“The test is whether
the enablement provided in the disclosure is commensurate in scope with the protection sought
by the claims.” (footnote omitted)).
193. Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
194. Id. at 1382.
195. Id. at 1384–85.
196. Id. at 1385.
197. Collins, supra note 13, at 1088.
198. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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that the inventor’s patent on a gas laser was enabling, even though it
failed to disclose one possible method for constructing it.199 This was
“not fatal” to the inventor’s patent because in “an art where the results
are predictable, e.g., mechanical as opposed to chemical arts, a broad
claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single embodiment, and is not
invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on another
embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.”200 From
a reproducibility perspective, this can be problematic. Inventions
predicated on single working embodiments are akin to research
conclusions based on low sample sizes. There is decreasing certainty
that their results are, in fact, more generalizable to a broader
population.
Lastly, the reasonableness doctrine attempts to navigate between
the first two. There, a patent application satisfies the enablement
requirement when there is a “‘reasonable correlation’ between the
disclosure and the claims.”201 Practically speaking, patent applicants or
litigants have attempted to use this reasonableness doctrine in
unpredictable arts where there is a wide disparity between the scope of
their claims—broad—and the scope of their disclosure—often narrow.
To support this analysis, defenders of the reasonableness doctrine
often invoke another of the court’s patent doctrines, that of the
“pioneering” inventor.202 Older court cases seem to have given leeway
to inventors of pioneering inventions “in exchange for their outsized
technological contribution to society.”203 Nonetheless, recent cases
have rejected the use of the reasonableness doctrine as the touchstone
for enablement.204
Although the Federal Circuit’s language has recently been more
forceful in adopting the full-scope doctrine as the polestar for

199. Id. at 1536–38. The patentee’s laser required securing several copper cups to the inside
of the laser’s discharge tube and disclosed several methods of doing so. It failed to teach one
method, however—the patentee’s own (and presumably proprietary) “six-stage [TiCuSil] braze
cycle.” Id. at 1531.
200. Id. at 1533 (citations omitted).
201. Collins, supra note 13, at 1089.
202. See, e.g., Plant Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (affirming the invalidation of a patent despite appellant’s challenge of the district
court’s failure to make a finding as to the invention’s “pioneer” status); In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488,
495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (invalidating the patent application’s claims even though “appellants assert
that their invention is ‘pioneering,’ and that this should entitle them to claims of broad scope”).
203. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 382 (2012).
204. See supra note 202.
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enablement,205 it has yet to overrule either the single-embodiment or
reasonableness doctrines. Confusion regarding the existence of these
alternative doctrines and when they might be applicable continues to
persist in the court’s own full-scope cases.206 And scholars have
criticized the rule as “unworkable.”207 But this only further
demonstrates the disconnect between encouraging thorough,
painstaking clinical research and enablement’s lesser requirements for
patentability. Concerning the latter, Bernard Chao has described the
arguable inequities in requiring perfect reproducibility in patent
applications: “There is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls
within a claim. In many cases, that embodiment will not be enabled.
But a claim should not be invalidated simply because the inventor did
not foresee every embodiment that may eventually fall within its
scope.”208
C. The Enablement Doctrine’s Relationship with Utility
Lastly, the enablement doctrine may also encourage
irreproducible patent claims in the way it is assessed alongside another
doctrine: utility. Indeed, in some circumstances, enablement and utility
are often confused. This is problematic because the heart of the utility
inquiry asks only whether an invention is theoretically possible, and not
whether, on the whole, it is consistently reproducible. A merging of the
two doctrines—as a few courts have done—allows patentees to claim
inventions that are largely irreproducible but nonetheless possible.
205. See, e.g., Promega Corp. v. Life Techs. Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“As
the extensive evidence here demonstrates, undue experimentation would have been required in
order to enable the full scope of coverage sought by Promega—the successful co-amplification of
potentially thousands of unrecited STR loci combinations.”); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott
Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[W]e find no genuine dispute that practicing the full
scope of the claims would require more than routine experimentation . . . .”); MagSil Corp. v.
Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Hitachi has shown with
clear and convincing evidence that one skilled in the art could not have taken the disclosure in
the specification regarding ‘change in the resistance by at least 10% at room temperature’ and
achieved a change in resistance in the full scope of that term without undue experimentation.”
(quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,629,922 col. 8 ll. 50–54 (filed Mar. 21, 1995))).
206. See, e.g., Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386 (“Even ‘a considerable amount of experimentation is
permissible,’ as long as it is ‘merely routine’ or the specification ‘provides a reasonable amount of
guidance’ regarding the direction of experimentation.” (quoting Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 1998))); MagSil, 687 F.3d at 1381 (“[T]he scope of the
claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided by the
specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.” (alteration in original) (quoting In re Fisher,
427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A. 1970))).
207. Chao, supra note 14, at 1378.
208. Id. (citations omitted).
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Utility arises from § 101 of the patent statute, which only allows
patents on “new and useful” inventions.209 This has long been “assumed
to be a ‘low bar’ to patentability or a ‘nonexistent’ patentability
requirement.”210 It demands only that the patented invention have
some beneficial use to the public and that the patent itself “be capable
of achieving the [invention’s] intended result.”211 Practically, these
requirements set such low thresholds as to be overcome for almost all
inventions except the fantastical: perpetual motion machines,212
processes for cold fusion,213 and elixirs of eternal youth,214 for example.
By contrast, enablement’s more robust standard requires that a patent
actually teach persons having ordinary skill in the patent’s art “to make
and use” the invention.215
Despite this difference, some courts have confusingly merged the
two doctrines. In classic enablement cases, courts have rejected patent
applications because they simply do not contain enough information to
allow a person having ordinary skill in the art to make and use the
invention. In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.,216 the Federal
Circuit concluded that Liebel-Flarsheim’s patent covering a syringe
lacked enablement “because the specification [did] not describe a
jacketless injector,” a required element of the patent’s claims.217 The
court’s opinion intimated that, had the specification described
jacketless injectors at all, it would have upheld Liebel-Flarsheim’s
patent.218
In other cases, however, enablement does not rise or fall on merely
the quantity of information provided in the specification, but its quality.

209. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
210. Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1046, 1049 (2014) (citations
omitted).
211. Id. at 1066.
212. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
213. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
214. In re Eltgroth, 419 F.2d 918, 922 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
216. Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
217. Id. at 1375, 1378.
218. See id. at 1378–80. The court noted:
The district court reasoned that the claims were invalid for lack of written description
because the specification does not describe a jacketless injector. The court noted that
the written description of the invention is directed to the improvement of ‘loading and
unloading a syringe given the constraints presented by the pressure jacket.’ . . . The
court further found that no prototypes of a jacketless injector had been made or
described at the time of filing . . . . (citation omitted in original).
Id. at 1375.
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When the supporting information in the specification gives the patent
examiner or the court some doubt that the invention will operate as
described, the assessor will often conclude that the patent or patent
application lacks enablement because the invention—even if it is
physically reduced to practice—will not work as advertised.219 In other
words, the patent disclosure, on its face, does not allow a person having
ordinary skill in the art to use the invention.
This is precisely what happened in Process Control Corp. v.
HydReclaim Corp.220 In Process Control, the patentee claimed a
method of using a gravimetric blender, a machine important in plastic
injection molding.221 The patent’s claims required the blender to
perform certain calculations when feeding its grist to a later machine,
a hopper.222 Those calculations commanded the blender to determine
a “material processing rate” by adding together the processing rate of
the material to the hopper with the processing rate of material coming
from the hopper.223 During claim construction, however, the district
court determined that the patent’s use of the term “material processing
rate” was no different from the processing rate of material to the
hopper.224 This presented sincere problems in math; the patent
required the blender to perform a calculation, A = A + B, that was, in
some instances, mathematically impossible.225 The patent’s
inoperability therefore rendered the patent invalid because it created
“a nonsensical method of operation,” one which “fail[ed] to comply

219. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Glob. Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“The specification containing these broad claims, however, does not contain sufficient
disclosure to present even a remote possibility that an ordinarily skilled artisan could have
achieved the modern dimensions of this art.”); In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d
1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[W]ith regard to studies cited in the specification showing
galantamine’s ability to reverse scopolamine-induced amnesia in normal rats . . . ‘[n]othing in this
teaching leads to an expectation of utility against Alzheimer’s disease.’” (second alteration in
original) (citation omitted)); Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The district court concluded that ‘[i]f “discharge rate” is construed as Process
Control asserts [i.e., the same as the first occurrence of discharge rate], this specification would
be nonsensical.’” (alteration in original) (quoting District Court order)).
220. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
221. Id. at 1352–54.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 1354.
224. Id. at 1357.
225. Id. at 1359 (“In other words, clause [d] requires determining a quantity from the sum of
that exact same quantity and something else, or symbolically, A = A + B, which is impossible,
where, as here, B is not equal to zero.” (brackets in original)).
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with the utility and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 and
112.”226
But most patents with inoperability concerns do not fail because
their inventions violate fundamental laws of physics or math. Rather,
putatively inoperable patents often fail simply because the
specification fostered doubt as to the invention’s ultimate success.227
This was the view of inoperability taken by the court in Eli Lilly, where
the court struggled to make sense of the dearth of evidence that
atomoxetine could be used to treat ADHD.228 There, the court referred
to this intersection between enablement and utility as
“enablement/utility.”229 As evidence for upholding the patent on these
“enablement/utility” grounds, the court proffered both evidence from
the patent’s specification as well as general scientific principles.230
It is this view of enablement—or more precisely, equating
enablement to inoperability in cases like Eli Lilly—that wrongly
conflates the two doctrines. Viewed broadly, the utility requirement is
simply concerned with whether the patent describes a use for its
claimed invention—any use will do. If the patent is silent or hopelessly
vague about the invention’s potential uses, or truly impossible as in
Process Control, then it is fair to say that the patent does not describe

226. Id. (emphasis added).
227. See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 111–13 (likening this aspect of inoperability to
“unpredictable and unreliable” results (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988)));
Seymore, supra note 210, at 1091. Seymore notes:
This last point reveals the paradoxical nature of the modern utility requirement as it
relates to disclosure. An applicant can assuredly disclose an invention which enables a
PHOSITA to make and use the invention (like a chemical compound), but can
nevertheless fail to meet the § 101 utility threshold because the subject matter is
deemed to be a “mere research proposal” or “simply an object of research.”
Id. (quoting In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
228. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–24 (Fed. Cir. 2011);
supra notes 152–61 and accompanying text.
229. Eli Lilly & Co., 435 F. App’x at 923.
230. Id. at 925 (“The district court’s statement that ‘there was no credible disclosure of utility
to begin with’ does not comport with the specification’s extensive disclosure of utility.” (quoting
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Activis Elizabeth LLC, 731 F. Supp. 2d 348, 386 n.18 (2010))); id. at 926. The
court noted:
In the case of atomoxetine, however, the norepinephrine relationship was known,
safety for antidepressant activity had been established, the specification contained a
full description of the utility, experimental verification had been obtained before the
patent was granted, and the examiner had not requested additional information. There
was no evidence that the disclosure is “on its face, contrary to generally accepted
scientific principles.”
Id. (quoting In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
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even a single use for its claimed invention.231 By contrast, a patent
should not fail for lack of utility if the uses it describes are plausible but
ultimately specious. Determining whether such uses are, in fact,
specious likely turns on whether someone can bring them into reality.
That inquiry—whether a person having ordinary skill in the art can
make or use the invention—is one for the doctrine of enablement, not
utility.
This distinction is critically important for unpredictable sciences
and industries where trial and error is the order of the day.232
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit has been clear that “[l]ack of
enablement and absence of utility are closely related grounds.”233
Although an inventor’s “misconceptions about scientific principles”
will not often invalidate the patent,234 this joining of enablement and
utility, even for well-supported but doubtful claims, remains.
III. IRREPRODUCIBILITY IN DRUG PATENTS
A. Incentives for Irreproducible Drug Patents
Despite enablement’s concern with disclosure and the workability
of inventions, reproducibility seems to play little role in patent law.
Patented inventions grounded in irreproducible science are not
stripped of their patents as a matter of course. The most relevant
doctrine, enablement, appears ill-suited to take irreproducibility into
account: it is unclear whether any postapplication evidence can be
introduced to invalidate patents based on irreproducible data, let alone
general scientific advances that call into question prior assumptions
about a particular field.235 Enablement’s relationship with the scope of
patents’ claims—and, consequently, which aspects of patents may or
may not be irreproducible—remains stubbornly unsettled.236
Moreover, the doctrine remains confusingly mixed up with operability,

231. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra note 210, at 1087–91 (discussing Brenner v.
Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1965)).
232. See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 120–27 (describing this in the context of biotechnology
process claims).
233. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
234. Id. at 1359.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part II.B.
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a single concern in the broader concept of irreproducibility.237 In this
sense, even though irreproducible patents can be thought of as
disenabling, they remain entitled, as with other patents, to an ongoing
presumption of validity.238
This disconnect between reproducibility and enablement becomes
particularly problematic in the case of patented drugs. The lifecycle of
the drug-approval process—discovery, preclinical development, an
Investigational New Drug Application with the FDA, three phases of
clinical trials, and, finally, approval—counsels patenting early on, when
very little data concerning drugs’ efficacy in their target populations is
available.239 Indeed, because of the “statutory bars”—statutory limits
on how long inventors have to file patent applications with the PTO
after initially disclosing their inventions—“the patent laws actually
penalize inventors who fail to file promptly.”240
To avoid this, drug developers often rely on early preclinical
studies to bolster their patents.241 By design, these studies often have
small sample sizes; employ little statistical power; and, of course, suffer
from conflicts of interest between industrial researchers and their

237. See supra Part II.C (discussing the differences among empirical, statistical, and
computational reproducibility).
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Eli Lilly’s
patent satisfied the enablement requirement even though the defendant raised doubts about the
studies included in the patent’s specification).
239. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (Newman, J., concurring) (per curiam), rev’d on other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997)
(“[T]he patent law places strong pressure on filing the patent application early in the development
of the technology, often before the commercial embodiment is developed or all of the boundaries
fully explored.”); Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 348 (“Basic ‘composition of matter’ patents on
drugs are typically issued in the early stages of product development, before the effects of these
molecules have been tested in clinical trials.”); Seymore, supra note 143, at 161–62 (quoting Hilton
Davis and discussing this in the context of pharmaceutical development); see also Cotropia, supra
note 20, at 93–96 (describing the negatives of early patent filing).
240. Seymore, supra note 143, at 162.
241. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEX.
L. REV. 503, 539 (2009) (“Pharmaceutical patents are typically filed when drugs are in early
preclinical research . . . .”).
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employers242—all hallmarks of irreproducibility.243 Nonetheless, patent
applications rooted in suspect data from preclinical trials do not suffer
at the PTO. Rather, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
requires only a “reasonable correlation” between a drug and its
asserted benefit,244 a standard that can be met with mere animal testing
or in vitro analyses.245 The PTO even appears to acknowledge the
deficiency of this approach, reminding its examiners that “[t]he
applicant does not have to prove that a correlation exists between a
particular activity and an asserted therapeutic use of a compound as a
matter of statistical certainty.”246
The early, easy patenting of drugs encourages patent applicants to
adopt several troublesome strategies at the PTO. Patentees of new
drugs, already encouraged to claim broadly,247 often draft their claims
as directed to methods of treating broader classifications of diseases
than any preclinical data warrants.248 U.S. Patent No. 8,652,776, for

242. See, e.g., Katherine S. Button et al., Power Failure: Why Small Sample Size Undermines
the Reliability of Neuroscience, 14 NATURE REVS.: NEUROSCIENCE 365, 373 (2013) (describing
these factors as “the root of the recent replication failures in the preclinical literature”); Ioannidis,
Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98 (same). See generally David M. Katz et al., Preclinical
Research in Rett Syndrome: Setting the Foundation for Translational Success, 5 DISEASE MODELS
& MECHANISMS 733 (2012) (attempting to establish best practices for preclinical research for
treatments of Rett syndrome); Iurii Koboziev, Fridrik Karlsson, Songlin Zhang & Matthew B.
Grisham, Pharmacological Intervention Studies Using Mouse Models of the Inflammatory Bowel
Diseases: Translating Preclinical Data into New Drug Therapies, 17 INFLAMMATORY BOWEL
DISEASES 1229 (2011) (criticizing preclinical studies of inflammatory bowel disease in mice);
Emily Sena, H. Bart van der Worp, David Howells & Malcolm Macleod, How Can We Improve
the Pre-Clinical Development of Drugs for Stroke?, 30 TRENDS NEUROSCIENCE 433 (2007)
(exploring the failures of preclinical studies in drugs for stroke); Hanna M. Vesterinen et al.,
Improving the Translational Hit of Experimental Treatments in Multiple Sclerosis, 16 MULTIPLE
SCLEROSIS 1044 (2010) (criticizing preclinical research for multiple sclerosis treatments on
various grounds).
243. Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98.
244. MPEP, supra note 163, § 2107.03.
245. Id.
246. Id. (emphasis added).
247. Chao, supra note 14, at 1366–67 (“Patent attorneys draft claims as broadly as they can.
In fact, they often deliberately seek overly broad claims in the hope that the patent office will
accept them.”).
248. See Budish et al., supra note 8, at 2077 (“[T]he drug Tamoxifen was FDA approved for
several cancer indications while on-patent; later, a publicly funded clinical trial supported the 1998
FDA approval of Tamoxifen as a chemoprevention agent, preventing breast cancer incidence in
high-risk groups.”); Feldman, supra note 13, at 13–15 (describing this in the context of antibody
therapeutics); Eileen M. Kane, Patent-Mediated Standards in Genetic Testing, 2008 UTAH L. REV.
835, 859 (“[T]he establishment of new mutations that are associated with clinical risk might rise
to the level of ‘undue experimentation’ that would indicate a patent claim that is potentially
broader than its disclosure.”); Price, supra note 77, at 445 (weighing similar incentives in the
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example, generally claims a method of using iloperidone to treat “one
or more symptoms of a psychotic disorder”—a virtually limitless
category—even though the preclinical studies referenced by the patent
refer almost exclusively to schizophrenia.249 Similarly, to the extent that
a drug has multiple forms, patentees are encouraged to base their
claims on the broadest genus of the drug, even if there is little data to
support their claims.250 Patentees for new drugs also have little
incentive to include in their applications a full description of the
statistical methods used in any of their preclinical research. Rather,
patentees are encouraged to say little about the methodology of any
supporting studies and then wait for an examiner’s response.251 In that
vein, the Federal Circuit’s conflicting decisions in In re ’318 Patent and
Eli Lilly suggest that examiners’ objections to preclinical studies—if
any—are of much greater consequence than whether the studies are,
in any sense, reproducible.252 Lastly, patentees may also be encouraged
to draft ambiguous claims in the hope of retaining textual flexibility as
developmental research on the studied drug progresses.253 Claiming a
method of treatment with keen specificity, for example, may hinder a
patent holder’s later efforts to expand the definition of that treatment
in future infringement suits.254 In these ways, the incentives giving rise
to irreproducible drug patents are the product of numerous
interrelated legal regimes: drug-development-patent policy, patentexamination procedure, FDA policy, and the economic realities of
preclinical testing.
context of diagnostic algorithms); Roin, supra note 241, at 522–26 (describing this practice’s effect
on patentability); Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1489, 1517–23
(discussing the history of patents on cancer treatments).
249. U.S. Patent No. 8,652,776 col. 15 ll. 60–61 (filed Sept. 10, 2008).
250. Seymore, supra note 143, at 145–46 (“A generic claim uses structural formulas or
functional language to cover embodiments that share a common attribute . . . and affords the
broadest claim scope under the patent laws. . . . Indeed, a single generic claim can easily
encompass millions, billions, or novemdecillions of compounds.” (citations omitted)). But see
Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (rejecting this
approach).
251. Lemley, supra note 13, at 117 (discussing the patentee’s strategy of “control[ling] when
the patent issues and with what claims” in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172
(E.D. Cal. 2002)).
252. Compare In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litigation, 583 F.3d 1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(noting the examiner’s objections to future evidence), with Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth
LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (noting the absence of objections by the
examiner).
253. See Chao, supra note 14, at 1372–75 (discussing the incentives behind unclear claiming).
254. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1090–92 (discussing the expansion of claim language with
time to cover after-arising technology).
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B. Examples of Irreproducible Drug Patents
The irreproducibility of drug patents does not occur only at the
margins. Numerous blockbuster drugs are protected by patents
grounded in some form of irreproducible data. Much in the same way
that irreproducibility is a varied concept,255 the character of
irreproducibility in drug patents is similarly varied: it can manifest in
patents based on contradicted preclinical or clinical trials, patents
based on irreproducible effects, patents covering a broader indication
or target population than warranted, and patents based on such a small
effect as to make their veracity doubtful. Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and
Avastin each respectively demonstrate these deficiencies.
1. Prempro: Contradicted Data. Perhaps the most extreme
example of patents grounded in later-contradicted data concerns those
related
to
postmenopausal
hormone-replacement
therapy.
Menopause—the cessation of ovulation in women, most often due to
age—has long been thought to bring with it several ailments, including
bone loss, cardiovascular disease, and ovarian cancer.256 Clinicians
attribute the onset of these illnesses, at least in part, to the decrease in
hormone production following menopause.257 Hormone-replacement
therapy (HRT)—small doses of hormones intended to mimic a
premenopausal state—was consequently viewed as a logical
treatment.258
Beginning in the 1980s, numerous companies began to
manufacture, market, and patent various types of HRTs as treatments
to ameliorate menopause-related illnesses.259 Wyeth Pharmaceuticals,
the largest HRT manufacturer,260 sold several different therapies:
Premarin, Prempro, and Premphase.261 Unsurprisingly, Wyeth also
255. For the differences between empirical, statistical, and computational reproducibility, see
supra Part I.A.
256. Millrood, supra note 101, at 42 (discussing Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note
101, at 321).
257. Id. (citing Bernardine Healy, The Mysteries of Menopause, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 18, 2002, at 39, 41).
258. Id. at 43 (examining the history of hormone therapy).
259. See id. at 42 (“In all, about 10 companies manufacture the more than two dozen hormone
therapy products currently available.”).
260. See In re Pfizer, Inc., 135 F.T.C. 608, 782 (2003) (noting that, prior to acquisition, Wyeth
was the primary HRT manufacturer).
261. See Ganesa Wegienka, Suzanne Havstad & Jennifer L. Kelsey, Menopausal Hormone
Therapy in a Health Maintenance Organization Before and After Women’s Health Initiative
Hormone Trials Termination, 15 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 369, 370–71 (2006).
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sought to protect each of these drugs with various patents. U.S. Patent
No. RE36,247, for example, covered Prempro,262 which claimed “[a]
method of hormonally treating menopausal or post-menopausal
disorders in a woman,”263 including “dosages and duration of
treatment . . . sufficient to prevent or retard changes in blood lipids
which might otherwise predispose the woman to cardiovascular
disease.”264 Yet the basis for the patent’s cardiovascular claims lay in a
single preclinical study, a study replete with the indicia of
irreproducibility: a small sample size of only thirty subjects; an opaque
and flexible design that did not clearly state the measurements for a
decrease in risk of cardiovascular disease; a significant potential for
conflict of interest, given the inventors’ original assignment of their
patent to an investment firm; and a high quotient of competitive
popularity with other treatments.265 Despite these concerns, Prempro’s
annual sales topped $733 million by 2001,266 its success much indebted
to Wyeth’s aggressive marketing of the drug’s cardiovascular benefit.267
The rapid rise of HRTs—and questions concerning their actual
benefits—led the NIH to support large-scale randomized trials of
HRTs.268 One such trial, a 2002 study of various HRTs, called the
Women’s Health Initiative Study, came to the opposite conclusion of
Prempro’s patent and an earlier, major 1991 observational trial.269
Rather than preventing cardiovascular disease in menopausal women,
HRTs, including Prempro, “significantly increased the relative risk of
coronary events by 29% among postmenopausal women.”270 A further
follow-up randomized trial, the Heart and Estrogen–Progestin
Replacement Study, came to a similar damning conclusion.271 The

262. See CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, TIME SENSITIVE PATENT
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO 21 C.F.R. 314.53 FOR NDA 20-527, at 2 (Apr. 13, 2000), http://
www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2003/20-527S017_Prempro%20&%20Premphase_
AdminCorres_P1.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6B4-FF8W] [hereinafter PATENT INFORMATION].
263. U.S. Patent No. Re. 36,247 col. 10 ll. 22–23 (filed Oct. 13, 1995).
264. Id. col. 16 ll. 7–9.
265. See id. col. 7 l. 57–col. 9 l. 17 (describing this study and its follow-up).
266. Millrood, supra note 101, at 42 n.3.
267. See id. at 43 (describing Wyeth’s marketing of its drugs).
268. E.g., Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note 101.
269. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223 (discussing the Women’s Health
Initiative Study, supra note 101, and the Nurses’ Health Study, supra note 100).
270. Id.; see also Women’s Health Initiative Study, supra note 101, at 321.
271. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 223 (discussing Stephen Hulley et al.,
Randomized Trial of Estrogen Plus Progestin for Secondary Prevention of Coronary Heart
Disease In Postmenopausal Women, 280 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 605, 605–13 (1998)).

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

888

[Vol. 66:845

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

results of these studies spawned countless lawsuits against Wyeth and
led, ultimately, to Wyeth’s successor, Pfizer, paying $896 million in
settlements.272
The products-liability issues aside, this turn of events would seem
to suggest that Prempro’s patent was never enabling in the first
instance. The patent’s claims that certain doses of progestogen and
estrogen could prevent cardiovascular disease were simply incorrect.273
In that sense, a person having ordinary skill in the medical art could
simply not “make and use” the invention.274 This conclusion seems to
hold despite the ambiguities in the enablement doctrine concerning its
scope: the patent’s claims lacked a corresponding enabling disclosure
no matter whether the enablement doctrine encompassed a full-scope,
single-embodiment, or reasonableness analysis.275 Furthermore,
whatever the difficulties surrounding enablement’s overlap with
inoperability, they appear neatly resolved when considering Prempro’s
patent: because the patented method produces the opposite effect of
what it intended, the claims ultimately required an impossible,
“nonsensical method of operation.”276
Yet, enablement’s focus on preapplication evidence, even in the
face of contradictory scientific advances,277 casts this analysis into
doubt. It is unclear whether litigants seeking to invalidate Prempro’s
patent could have introduced such evidence. A recent district court
lawsuit, Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Mylan Inc.,278 suggests otherwise.279 In
Gilead, the plaintiffs sought discovery of the defendants’ Abbreviated
New Drug Application with the FDA, to combat the defendants’
arguments concerning the asserted patent’s lack of enablement.280 The
district court refused on the grounds that “everything that the Plaintiffs
would need to defend against a claim of invalidity through enablement
272. Jef Feeley, Pfizer Paid $896 Million in Prempro Settlements, BLOOMBERG (June 19,
2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-19/pfizer-paid-896-million-in-premproaccords-filing-shows-1- [https://perma.cc/Z5KP-RF2B].
273. See U.S. Patent No. Re. 36,247 col. 16 ll. 7–9 (filed Oct. 13, 1995).
274. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
275. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1088 (describing the differences in these doctrines).
276. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
see also supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties concerning enablement’s relationship with
inoperability).
277. See supra Part II.A.
278. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Mylan, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-99, 2015 WL 4042161 (N.D. W. Va. July 1,
2015).
279. Id. at *1–2.
280. Id.
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theory [was] within the four corners of the Plaintiffs’ own patent.”281
This suggests, too, that everything the defendants needed to make their
claim of invalidity was also limited to the four corners of the patent.
Ultimately, Prempro’s patent was never litigated to judgment in
federal court,282 and it quietly expired on May 2, 2006.283
2. Xigris: Irreproducible Effects. Not all irreproducible patents
have contradictory indications. Others are irreproducible because
follow-on trials are unable to reproduce the effects seen in preclinical
or early-stage clinical trials; the underlying data is literally
irreproducible. Xigris, a drug approved by the FDA in 2001 to treat
sepsis284 and voluntarily withdrawn by its manufacturer Eli Lilly in
2011,285 serves as a prime example.
Sepsis is a general inflammatory response to an infection.286 In
severe cases, sepsis can cause the coagulation of blood and the creation
of circulating blood clots.287 These symptoms are often worse than the
initial infection: coagulation and clotting from sepsis is the tenth
leading cause of death in the United States, where it kills over a million
people a year, or 6 percent of all recorded deaths.288 The inflammation
pathway giving rise to sepsis is complex—isolating the proteins
responsible still baffles scientists289—but one protein involved,

281. Id. at *2.
282. Intermediary owners of the Prempro patent filed only one lawsuit against two other HRT
manufacturers, Novo Nordisk and Pharmacia & Upjohn, in the U.S. District Court for the District
of New Jersey. That case settled by consent decree. Consent Decree and Order, Am. Home Prods.
Corp. v. Novo Nordisk Pharm., Inc., No. 3:99-cv-3162 (D.N.J.) (signed June 23, 2000), ECF No.
24.
283. See PATENT INFORMATION, supra note 262, at 2.
284. See FDA, FDA CLINICAL REVIEW DROTRECOGIN ALFA (ACTIVATED) 1, 8
(Nov. 21, 2001), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsare
developedandapproved/approvalapplications/therapeuticbiologicapplications/ucm113438.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S6B4-HCKS] [hereinafter FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA].
285. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Announces Withdrawal of Xigris® Following Recent
Clinical Trial Results (Oct. 25, 2011), https://investor.lilly.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=
617602 [https://perma.cc/L5CX-6CLM].
286. FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA, supra note 284, at 9.
287. Id.
288. See Alexander Melamed & Frank J. Sorvillo, The Burden of Sepsis-Associated Mortality
in the United States from 1999 to 2005: An Analysis of Multiple-Cause-Of-Death Data, 13
CRITICAL CARE, No. 1, 2009, at 1.
289. Charalampos Pierrakos & Jean-Louis Vincent, Sepsis Biomarkers: A Review, 14
CRITICAL CARE, No. 15, 2010, at 1.
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activated protein C (APC), had long been hypothesized to play a role
in inhibiting fatal coagulation and clotting.290
In 2001, Eli Lilly received FDA approval for a recombinant
version of APC, marketed as Xigris, for the treatment of severe
sepsis.291 Eli Lilly also obtained a number of patents claiming the use
of APC to treat sepsis, including U.S. Patent Nos. 6,344,197 and
6,489,296.292 But, having yet to complete its clinical trials for APC by
the time the patents were filed, both patents were based on early
preclinical data. The ’197 patent, for example, claims “[a] method of
treating a patient suffering from sepsis” by administering a
combination of APC and another protein, bactericidal/permeabilityincreasing protein, based on the patient’s body weight.293 Given the
patent’s description of the invention, this sounds like a promising
treatment. Yet, the basis for the ’197 patent’s claims rests only on the
thinnest reed of data: a preclinical, prophylactic trial in baboons—and
even then, only ten baboons.294 As for a human trial, the patent only
proposes a protocol for conducting one.295
The ’296 patent similarly claims “[a] method of reducing mortality
in a human patient with severe sepsis which comprises administering a
dose of human activated Protein C to the patient as a continuous
infusion.”296 But unlike the ’197 patent, the basis for the ’296 patent’s
claims seems more robust: an actual human-subject clinical trial that
measured the mortality rate of sepsis-suffering subjects receiving APC
against those who did not.297 Although the sample size of the trial was
small—only seventy-two subjects total—the results seemed strong:
sepsis patients receiving APC died at almost half the rate of the
patients who did not receive APC after twenty-eight days.298 In
comparison to the ’197 patent’s data, the results predicating the ’296
patent seemed promising. And that promise—as well as the ’197 and
’296 patents, among others—led Eli Lilly to aggressively market Xigris.
Eventually, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services accepted

290.
291.
292.
1999).
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

FDA, DROTRECOGIN ALFA, supra note 284, at 9.
See id. at 1, 8.
U.S. Patent No. 6,489,296 (filed May 10, 2000); U.S. Patent No. 6,344,197 (filed Oct. 22,
’197 Patent col. 10 ll. 39–43.
Id. col. 2 ll. 19–36.
Id. col. 10 ll. 6–37.
’296 Patent col. 15 ll. 14–17.
Id. col. 13 l. 48–col. 14 l. 49.
Id. col. 13 ll. 54–56, col. 14 ll. 4–10.
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Xigris as “the first and only medical product to be granted new
technology status for the substantial improvement in . . . patients with
life-threatening severe sepsis.”299 As a result, Xigris garnered Eli Lilly
over $100 million per year in sales.300
This promise was not to last, however. The FDA conditioned its
approval of Xigris on a larger follow-up study that enrolled over a
thousand patients, rather than mere dozens.301 That study showed that
Xigris did no better than the placebo and “was not beneficial when
administered to a population of patients for which it was an approved
treatment.”302 The new study, in other words, failed to reproduce the
results of Eli Lilly’s earlier study. Faced with this irreproducible data
and physician ire,303 Eli Lilly withdrew its drug from the FDA’s
marketing rolls.304
And yet, to date, the Xigris patents live on. Neither the ’197 nor
the ’296 patent appear to have been challenged in federal court, by a
generic competitor or otherwise. And this remains so despite the
patents’ potential invalidity for lack of enablement. The core of both
patents’ claims—a method of treating sepsis using APC—could not be
reproduced in a large-scale, randomized clinical trial. This does not
necessarily make them false. Nor does it mean that yet another trial
could not conclude otherwise. But it does suggest that, for a person
having ordinary skill in the art to “make and use” APC as a sepsis
treatment, many more, and more robust, clinical trials would need to
be conducted—a case of “undue experimentation” if there ever was
one.305
But the complexities in the enablement doctrine itself complicate
this analysis. First, given the conflicting data on the efficacy of Xigris,

299. Judy Stone, Lilly’s Shocker, or the Post-Marketing Blues, SCI. AM. GUEST BLOG (Nov.
2, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/lillys-shocker-or-the-post-marketingblues [https://perma.cc/4Z2E-P5M6].
300. Antonio Regalado, To Sell Pricey Drug, Eli Lilly Fuels a Debate over Rationing,
WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2003, 1:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106382950695778600
[https://perma.cc/YB9X-CHT9].
301. See Stone, supra note 299, at 1–2; see also ELI LILLY & CO., FOLLOW-UP DATA OF
PATIENTS TREATED WITH XIGRIS® DROTRECOGIN ALFA (ACTIVATED) IN FRANCE 2 (2009),
http://www.lillytrials.com/nonintstudies/result_files/12401.pdf [https://perma.cc/XSE2-EAMC]
(enrolling 1049 patients).
302. V. Marco Ranieri et al., Drotrecogin Alfa (Activated) in Adults with Septic Shock, 366
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2055, 2063 (2012).
303. See Regalado, supra note 300.
304. Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., supra note 285.
305. See supra notes 133–36 and accompanying text.
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it is unclear whether the patents are disenabling for the entire scope of
their claims or just some part of them.306 Xigris may, in fact, work for
some patients in some circumstances (although this is doubtful).307 In
that sense, whether the Xigris patents are enabling turns on resolving
the scope of the enablement inquiry. Furthermore, to the degree
enablement overlaps with utility in the pharmaceutical context, it is
unclear whether the patents truly require a prohibited “nonsensical
method of operation,”308 or whether they merely require an
improbable but plausible method of operation. Lastly, although the
’197 patent appears to be based on truly paltry data, the ’296 patent is
rooted in what appears to be a serious preclinical trial—one later
confirmed by a larger clinical trial and only then refuted by an even
larger clinical trial. To that end, determining whether postapplication
evidence can be introduced to invalidate a patent for lack of
enablement does not, in fact, resolve the enablement inquiry.309 Rather,
it also raises questions of which postapplication evidence can be used
at all and which is controlling. Therefore, in a greater sense, Xigris
demonstrates the disconnect between drug development and patent
validity: unlike Xigris, which rose and fell on the strength of the clinical
data used to assess it, the Xigris patents appear to rise or fall on
resolving the contours of the enablement doctrine.
3. Plavix: Broader Indication or Target Population than
Warranted. Some pharmaceutical patents are irreproducible not due
to the overall truth or falsity of their claims but for reasons having to
do with precision: they claim a broader indication or patient population
than the underlying data warrants. Plavix, for example, was approved
by the FDA to reduce “atherosclerotic events,” that is, heart attacks,
strokes, and vascular death, in patients previously diagnosed with
atherosclerosis.310 The drug itself—clopidogrel bisulfate—acts on one

306. For a discussion of this difficulty in the enablement doctrine, see supra Part II.B.
307. See Ranieri et al., supra note 302, at 2062 (“The lack of benefit was consistent across
predefined subgroups.”).
308. See Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
309. See supra Part II.A.
310. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, Final Printed Labeling, in CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY AND BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW, APPROVAL PACKAGE FOR PLAVIX 11,
18 (1997), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/97/20839_Plavix_appltr_prntlbl_
medr_chemr_EA_phrmr.pdf [https://perma.cc/DCT7-HKSL]; see CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION
AND RESEARCH, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & BIOPHARMACEUTICS REVIEW, PLAVIX 2
(1997), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/97/20839_Plavix_clinphrmr_P1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2H7M-7325] [hereinafter FDA, PLAVIX].
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particular protein, P2Y12, to block its role in platelet aggregation, one
of the steps in harmful blood clotting.311 At its peak in 2011, Plavix
generated $9.3 billion in revenue for Sanofi and Bristol-Myers Squibb,
two pharmaceutical giants.312 And naturally, Sanofi was granted a
patent on the method of using Plavix to “prevent[] the occurrence of a
secondary ischemic event.”313
Prior to Plavix exerting its effect on P2Y12, however, it must be
metabolized into several intermediary chemicals.314 But not all patients
metabolize Plavix similarly. Rather, up to a quarter of all Plavix
patients fail to respond to Plavix due to differences in several genes
responsible for drug metabolism.315 One such gene, CYP2C19, plays an
outsized role in responsiveness to Plavix.316 Plavix patients with
dysfunctional variants of CYP2C19 are three-and-a-half times more
likely to experience a secondary ischemic event than patients without
the variant.317 In other words, a large subpopulation of Plavix patients
is entirely resistant to the treatment.318 In 2011, an enormous follow-on
meta-analysis of 42,000 patients confirmed the importance of these
genetic differences,319 and the FDA later required Sanofi to include this
information on Plavix’s label.320

311. Rashmi R. Shah & Devron R. Shah, Personalized Medicine: Is It a Pharmacogenetic
Mirage?, 74 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 698, 702 (2012).
312. Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs of All Time; Humira Joins The Elite, FORBES
(Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonking/2013/01/28/the-best-selling-drugs-of-alltime-humira-joins-the-elite [https://perma.cc/X9VV-3Z3E].
313. U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 col. 6 ll. 60–61 (filed Jan. 31, 1994).
314. Shah & Shah, supra note 311, at 702 (“Clopidogrel is pharmacologically inactive and
requires activation to its pharmacologically active thiol metabolite that binds irreversibly to the
P2Y12 receptors on platelets.”).
315. See Jean-Sébastien Hulot et al., Cytochrome P450 2C19 Loss-of-Function Polymorphism
Is a Major Determinant of Clopidogrel Responsiveness in Healthy Subjects, 108 BLOOD 2244, 2244
(2006) (“The pharmacodynamic response to clopidogrel varies widely from subject to subject, and
about 25% of patients treated with standard clopidogrel doses display low ex vivo inhibition of
ADP-induced platelet aggregation. . . . [C]ertain genetic factors may be involved in this
phenomenon.”).
316. Id.
317. Shah & Shah, supra note 311, at 702–03.
318. See Hulot et al., supra note 315, at 2244.
319. See Michael V. Holmes et al., CYP2C19 Genotype, Clopidogrel Metabolism, Platelet
Function, and Cardiovascular Events: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 306 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2704, 2704 (2011).
320. FDA Updates Plavix Label with PGx Data, but Does Not Provide Dosing
Recommendations, GENOMEWEB (June 17, 2009), https://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/fdaupdates-plavix-label-pgx-data-does-not-provide-dosing-recommendations [https://perma.cc/VF
Y4-MYKC].
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But the FDA did not require, or even suggest, that Sanofi correct
its underlying patents.321 To the contrary, Sanofi’s Plavix method-ofuse patent makes no mention of CYP2C19 or even the possibility that
genetic differences among patients may play a role in its
effectiveness.322 This overly broad view of Plavix’s efficacy—one that
fails to acknowledge that the treatment will fail in up to a quarter of
patients—calls the enablement of the patent into question. The
patent’s claims, directed to “[a] method for preventing the occurrence
of a secondary ischemic event [by] administering to a patient . . . a
therapeutically effective amount of [Plavix],”323 do not limit themselves
to patients with functioning metabolisms of Plavix. For patients with
such metabolic deficiencies, there is no “therapeutically effective
amount”324 of the drug. In terms of enablement, a physician treating a
patient with such a deficiency cannot—by virtue of biology—“make
[or] use” the patented invention.325
But again, whether this invalidates the patent seems to turn less
on genetics and more on defining the contours of enablement. To the
degree that enablement requires a person having ordinary skill in the
art to work every limitation of the patent’s claims,326 it seems clear that
the Plavix method-of-use patent is invalid. But for three-quarters of the
patient populace, the invention is invaluable, “a drug of ‘major
historical significance.’”327 Under a reasonableness or even a singleembodiment interpretation of enablement,328 therefore, the Plavix
method-of-use patent seems enabling, beyond dispute.
Even with the contours of enablement resolved, there remains the
thornier issue of how to treat the scientific advances concerning
genotyping and genetic sequencing in relation to an older patent. The
Plavix method-of-use patent was filed in 1994,329 when genetic

321. For a discussion concerning the FDA’s role, or lack thereof, in policing drug patents, see
Jacob S. Sherkow, Administrating Patent Litigation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 205, 214–16 (2015).
322. See U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 (filed Jan. 31, 1994).
323. Id. col. 6 ll. 60–63.
324. Id. col. 6 ll. 62–63.
325. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
326. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1088 & nn.19–21 (describing the full-scope doctrine).
327. Michael O’Riordan, So Long, Plavix, What a Ride! Clopidogrel Patent Expires,
MEDSCAPE: HEARTWIRE (May 17, 2012), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/764052 [https://
perma.cc/Y6ES-SAT8].
328. See supra notes 197–204 and accompanying text.
329. See U.S. Patent No. 5,576,328 (filed Jan. 31, 1994).
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sequencing was in a relative infancy.330 It was therefore unlikely, if not
impossible, for the inventor to have been able to assess genetic
differences among potential Plavix patients contributing to the drug’s
efficacy—or lack thereof. In this sense, fixing the enablement inquiry
at the time the patent was filed seems to produce one outcome—
validity—whereas future advances produce another—invalidity.331
Lastly, the Plavix patent demonstrates just how confusing
enablement’s entanglement with the inoperability doctrine can be. For
normal patients, the invention described in the Plavix patent has a welldefined use—the reduction of secondary ischemic events. But for
patients with a CYP2C19 deficiency, the invention is simply useless—
it borders, in the words of the Process Control court, on a “nonsensical
method of operation.”332 Although inoperability seems to take hold
only when all embodiments of a patent invention are facially
inoperable, it is unclear how the doctrine works—and how it relates to
enablement—where an invention is facially inoperable, but only to
some users. Plavix accordingly highlights the difficulties in aligning
precision medicine with precision claiming.
4. Avastin: Small Effect Size. Yet other drug patents seem likely
to be irreproducible due to small effect size—that even assuming a
statistically significant difference between the drug and a placebo, the
benefit of the drug is so small as to make the result doubtful.333 This is,
in fact, a frequent problem with cancer drugs, where the effect size of
overall patient survival is often measured in only one or two months.334
Such small effects often cast doubt on whether the original clinical
trials supporting cancer drugs’ approval are reproducible.335 And they
also cast doubt on patent claims predicated on using such drugs to treat
cancer.
Avastin—a monoclonal antibody manufactured by Roche—was
first approved by the FDA in 2004 to treat metastatic colorectal

330. See ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND THE HUMAN
GENOME 56–77 (1994) (discussing the history of genetic sequencing).
331. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 106–07 (discussing fixing the meaning of claim terms, and
consequently enablement, at the time the patent was filed).
332. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
333. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 697–98 (discussing small effect size and
reproducibility).
334. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text.
335. See Light & Lexchin, supra note 9, at h2068 (discussing the incremental benefit of many
approved cancer drugs).
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cancer.336 The drug was later proven successful—and approved by the
FDA—to treat several other cancers, including lung, kidney, brain, and
breast cancer.337 But its efficacy in treating breast cancer was
notoriously small. Tested as a combination therapy with another breast
cancer drug, paclitaxel—a typical procedure for cancer clinical trials—
Avastin improved overall patient survival by a mere 1.7 months.338
Nonetheless, the FDA approved Avastin for metastatic breast cancer
in 2008, although on the condition that Roche conduct two additional
follow-on trials.339
This insignificant increase in overall survival led several clinicians
to question the reproducibility of the drug’s efficacy in treating breast
cancer. Immediately following approval, the New York Times ran a
front-page story noting that “the drug prolongs life by only a few
months, if that.”340 One clinician called the results “sobering.”341 A 2009
editorial on Avastin described its efficacy in breast cancer as “probably
nonexistent, even if measured in days.”342 A 2010 review of several
small-effect cancer therapies criticized Avastin as providing only
“marginal benefits . . . after it was shown to ‘prolong’ [overall survival]
by a statistically insignificant 1.7 months.”343 And David Gorski, a
clinical oncologist and editor of the blog Science-Based Medicine,
called the approval results “thin gruel.”344
Two later follow-on trials of Avastin in breast cancer proved these
doubts well-founded. One trial concluded that Avastin decreased
patient overall survival by 1.1 to 1.7 months; another found that
Avastin increased overall survival but only by 2.9 months.345 This
conflicting data—and some additional evidence that Avastin was
336. FDA, FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT: ONCOLOGY DRUG ADVISORY COMMITTEE
MEETING 7 (2010), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeeting
Materials/Drugs/OncologicDrugsAdvisoryCommittee/UCM219224.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ3PXVF4] [hereinafter FDA, AVASTIN].
337. Id.
338. Id. at 27.
339. Id. at 9, 27.
340. Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, In Costly Cancer Drug, Hope and a Dilemma, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1.
341. Id.
342. Fojo & Grady, supra note 21, at 1045.
343. Fojo & Parkinson, supra note 21, at 5973.
344. David Gorski, Avastin and Metastatic Breast Cancer: When Science-Based Medicine
Collides with FDA Regulation, SCI.-BASED MED. (Aug. 30, 2010), https://www.sciencebased
medicine.org/avastin-and-metastatic-breast-cancer-when-science-based-medicine-collides-withfda-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/D3CM-LQ3S].
345. FDA, AVASTIN, supra note 336, at 27.
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causing unwanted side effects—eventually caused the FDA to pull
approval for Avastin as a treatment of metastatic breast cancer.346
Despite all of this, patents on Avastin as a “method of treating
breast cancer” abound.347 For example, U.S. Patent No. 8,017,735,
owned by Merck & Co., claims “[a] method for treating [breast]
cancer”348 by using Avastin as a combination therapy with another
antibody.349 U.S. Patent No. 8,859,542, originally assigned to Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals, similarly claims “[a] method of treating [breast]
cancer”350 by administering Avastin in conjunction with a triazine
derivative.351 And U.S. Patent No. 9,066,963 claims “[a] method of
treating breast cancer in a subject in need thereof”352 by using Avastin
with anthracycline.353
Whether such inventions are indeed cancer treatments, as they
claim, likely turns on what constitutes a “treatment.”354 Yet, where the
relative effect size of the treatment is so small as to likely be
irreproducible—as it was with Avastin—it seems specious to allow
patents to claim a drug as a “method of treatment”; it is highly doubtful
that the patented drug actually treats the indicated disease. Because a
person having ordinary skill in the art would need to engage in undue
experimentation to determine whether the claimed therapy constitutes
a “method of treating cancer,”355 cancer treatment patents of this kind
are likely invalid for lacking enablement. Such patents are similar to
the patent at issue in In re ’318 Patent,356 where the cited references
concerning a treatment for Alzheimer’s was a “mere research
proposal.”357 Indeed, cancer-treatment patents—like cures for
346. Press Release, FDA, FDA Commissioner Announces Avastin Decision: Drug Not
Shown to Be Safe and Effective in Breast Cancer Patients (Nov. 18, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm280536.htm [https://perma.cc/NYX8-5UDM].
347. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,066,963 col. 289 ll. 20–21 (filed Mar. 15, 2012).
348. U.S. Patent No. 8,017,735 col. 89 l. 51 (filed Nov. 19, 2004).
349. Id. col. 95 l. 28.
350. U.S. Patent No. 8,859,542 col. 223 l. 25 (filed Apr. 23, 2014).
351. Id. col. 1, l. 25, col. 228 l. 26.
352. ’963 Patent col. 289 ll. 20–21.
353. Id. col. 290, ll. 20, 31–31.
354. Because the definition of medical treatments could be broad, generally—including
interventions that provide little, if any, therapeutic benefit—definitions of cancer treatments may
similarly be broadened beyond mere issues of therapeutic efficacy. Cf. Fojo & Grady, supra note
21, at 1047 (“Ultimately, however, what counts as a benefit in cancer treatment and how much
cost should factor into deliberations are not ethical problems that can be relegated to others.”).
355. See supra notes 134–36, 142–52 and accompanying text.
356. In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
357. See id. at 1324, 1327.
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baldness—have been specifically spotlighted by the Federal Circuit as
a “notoriously intractable area[]” to prove enablement.358
Interestingly, however, this analysis seems to hold despite the
ambiguities in enablement doctrine. The skepticism surrounding small
effect sizes for therapies in complex diseases is independent of whether
enablement is assessed according to the full scope of the contested
patent’s claims or only a single embodiment of them.359 A method of
treating cancer dubious at the time of filing is likely to continue being
dubious until proven otherwise. Similarly, the difficulties concerning
replicating studies with small effect sizes are apparent at the time of
filing—as demonstrated by clinicians’ concern with Avastin as a breast
cancer therapy before the results of the FDA’s mandated follow-on
studies.360 To that extent, resolving questions of whether
postapplication evidence or new scientific advances are allowed to
prove a lack of enablement becomes less important.361 And lastly, the
confusing overlap between enablement and lack of utility362 becomes
less confusing where the treatment in question appears, in some senses,
useless. As with Avastin, clinicians—and the PTO—are right to ask,
“What is the minimum amount of benefit needed to adopt a therapy as
the new standard? Is 1.2 months of additional life a ‘good’ in itself?”363
C. The Social Costs of Irreproducible Drug Patents
The regulatory history of Prempro, Xigris, Plavix, and Avastin—
all drugs once approved and later withdrawn—would suggest a selfcorrecting mechanism at work: The FDA appears to eventually catch
drugs grounded in truly irreproducible data, and demands their
discontinuance to the financial detriment of their manufacturers. Drug
manufacturers become wary about developing—and, consequently,
patenting—irreproducible drugs. And once drugs are removed from
the market at the request of the FDA, the patents covering such drugs
become worthless because the products that they cover cannot be
legally sold.

358. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(requiring “special procedures . . . for subject matter in once notoriously intractable areas such as
cures for baldness or cancer”).
359. For a discussion of these doctrines, see supra Part II.B.
360. See supra notes 340–44 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part II.A.
362. See supra Part II.C.
363. Fojo & Grady, supra note 21, at 1045.
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To the contrary. The proliferation of drug patents grounded in
irreproducible data brings with it numerous social costs affecting drug
research, scientific integrity, and patient safety. The incentives giving
rise to irreproducible patents may have the most startling effect on
drug development and research. A recent study by Eric Budish,
Benjamin Roin, and Heidi Williams empirically assesses the effects of
easy early patenting when combined with the pressures of FDA
approval and market races.364 By examining data concerning cancer
clinical trials and firm investment, the authors conclude that “private
firms may invest more in late-stage cancer drugs—and too little in earlystage cancer and cancer prevention drugs—because late-stage cancer
drugs can be brought to market comparatively quickly, whereas drugs
to treat early-stage cancer and to prevent cancer require a much longer
time to bring to market.”365
One of the drivers behind this underinvestment in early-stage
treatment and prevention surrounds the “structure of the patent
system”366: by requiring the patenting of drugs before substantial
clinical trials have been conducted—that is, by encouraging
irreproducible patents as a condition of economic success—the patent
system has encouraged drug developers to focus on treatments that
maximize patent life span.367 This has meant, according to Budish,
Roin, and Williams’s data, that private drug developers have
practically ignored a core measure of reproducibility in their research:
the long-term survival of patients. In fact, there is a negative correlation
between the percentage of privately sponsored clinical trials and the
five-year survival rate of patients enrolled in those trials.368 And as for
development projects that last longer than the patent term—twenty
years—“essentially 100 percent are publicly funded.”369 The incentives
of private cancer drug development in the United States, therefore, are
to obtain patents quickly on relatively thin data, which can then be used
to expedite drug approval on short-term clinical measurements: a
recipe for irreproducibility.370 The cost of this “corporate short-

364. Budish et al., supra note 8, at 2045–46.
365. Id. at 2045.
366. Id.
367. See id. at 2074–75.
368. Id. at 2075 fig.5.
369. Id. at 2074.
370. See id. at 2047–49 (discussing some of the perverse incentives in allowing firms to utilize
surrogate endpoints).

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

900

[Vol. 66:845

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

termism” is astronomical: “890,000 lost life-years . . . [valued] on the
order of $89 billion.”371
Research incentives—and their failures—aside, irreproducible
patents also seem to contribute to the opacity of clinical trial data.
Besides data obtained from clinical trials themselves, applicants for
new drugs must report to the FDA “any other data or information
relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the drug
product,” including the same preclinical data that are often the subject
of a drug’s patents.372 This discourages applicants from producing—and
disclosing in patent applications—robust and potentially invalidating
preclinical data. This occurs widely in the diagnostics field, where light
regulation has coincided with a recent gold rush to patent basic
materials and methods of the art.373 Approval is easy,374 the underlying
data may be kept confidential,375 patents are valuable,376 and robust
assessments of reproducibility are scant.377 This all “creates some
unique points of conflict, with consequences for the integrity of the
scientific field and for the quality of patient services.”378
Similarly, the existence of irreproducible patents further
discourages the creation or sharing of clinical information after FDA
approval. Patents protecting a new, approved drug are entitled to a
presumption of validity, as with all other patents.379 This presumption
means that even baldly irreproducible patents require no further proof
of their validity—no follow-on studies as a condition of their issuance.
Nonetheless, because postapplication data can be used to invalidate
patents in some circumstances,380 drug developers have little incentive
371. Id. at 2049.
372. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2016).
373. Kane, supra note 248, at 838.
374. See Rachel E. Sachs, Innovation Law and Policy: Preserving the Future of Personalized
Medicine, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1881, 1889–93 (2016) (discussing the lack of regulation
surrounding many diagnostic tests).
375. ILLUMINA INC., MISEQDX CYSTIC FIBROSIS SYSTEM: PREMARKET NOTIFICATION,
510(K) SUMMARY (2013), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh_docs/pdf12/K124006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LUS7-RVDD] (marking approval information for the drug MiSeqDx as confidential).
376. See Sherkow & Scott, supra note 83, at 260 (discussing the value of diagnostic patents).
377. Lau, Ioannidis & Schmid, supra note 9, at 123 (noting that “[t]he number [of metaanalyses] is small compared with the estimate of half a million randomised controlled trials”).
378. Kane, supra note 248, at 838.
379. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 923–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Eli Lilly’s
patent satisfied the enablement requirement even though the defendant raised doubts about the
studies included in the patent’s specification).
380. See supra notes 142–62 and accompanying text.
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to engage in follow-on studies in the fear of uncovering harmful data
that may cast their patents—or, worse, their FDA approvals—into
doubt.381 Thus, for fear of putting patents into jeopardy, drug
manufacturers are encouraged to deprive the medical community of
the very sort of information that may elucidate whether the benefits of
a particular treatment are, or are not, reproducible.
In addition, irreproducible patents may affect competitors’
development programs by discouraging research into and development
of alternative uses of known drugs. Because patents on new drugs can
be obtained even with sketchy efficacy data,382 drug developers who
receive composition patents on new drugs have a de facto monopoly
on all marketable uses of the drug until the original composition patent
expires: competitors cannot sell the same drug for a different
indication—even if they were the first to run clinical trials for that
indication—without receiving a patent license.383 More pragmatically,
all drug developers, focused on short-term goals with limited research
budgets, have little incentive to even begin research into alternative
uses of known, patented compounds until after those compounds’
primary patents expire384—even if they suspect that the drug’s efficacy
data is likely irreproducible.
Finally, irreproducible patents risk becoming weaponized by
aggressive patent holders seeking to quash competition in related
areas. Patents claiming new effects of old technologies—such as new
indications for an old drug—can potentially be used to enjoin
competitors from the manufacture or sale of the older pharmaceutical,
even if the new indications later turn out to be ineffective.385 This has
recently become an issue in the nutritional supplement industry for
381. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 370 (“[T]rial sponsors stand to lose revenue if trials
indicate that their products are unsafe or ineffective for certain indications. Indeed, from the
perspective of the manufacturer, rigorous clinical trials of off-label uses may be as likely to
diminish the value of a particular product as to enhance it.”).
382. See supra Parts I.C & III.B.
383. W. Nicholson Price II, Making Do in Making Drugs: Innovation Policy and
Pharmaceutical Manufacturing, 55 B.C. L. REV. 491, 525 (2014) (“Composition patents are more
valuable because a patent on the drug’s active ingredient allows the patentee to exclude others
from making, selling, or using the drug for any use, even those uses not specifically envisioned by
the patentee.”).
384. See Eisenberg, supra note 24, at 370; Laakmann, supra note 25, at 157–58.
385. See, e.g., In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 526–28 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(allowing the patentee to assert claims covering virtually all statins, even though the evidence
suggested that only a single species was effective); Cancer Research Tech. Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc.,
625 F.3d 724, 734 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (allowing the patentee to assert claims against a competitor
even though it withheld negative clinical study data from the PTO).
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patents held by Thermolife International, a nutritional supplement
manufacturer. Research in the early 1990s by former Stanford
professor John P. Cooke suggested that an amino acid, L-arginine, may
increase the natural production of one chemical in the blood, nitric
oxide, which had been thought to improve exercise performance.386
After obtaining patents on this use of L-arginine, however, follow-on
research significantly discounted the effect.387 Nonetheless, Thermolife
then purchased the patents from Stanford and began to assert them
against competitors selling products merely containing L-arginine—an
integral component of virtually all protein powders.388 Thus, although
other supplement manufacturers had been selling L-argininecontaining products for years, and although follow-on research
demonstrated that the effect on nitric-oxide production described in
the patent was not effective, Thermolife has been able to use these
irreproducible patents to wreak havoc through the nutritional
supplement industry.389
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF IRREPRODUCIBILITY TO PATENT LAW
The widespread existence of irreproducible patents—in an area of
technology often held as an exemplar of the patent system—shows a
broad disconnect between scientific advancement and innovation
policy. Unlike peer review, scientific reputation, or grant funding,
patents do little to serve as verifiers of truth despite various
requirements concerning the disclosure or workability of claimed
inventions. Although this disconnect has broad significance for
innovation policy, this Article’s findings also have significance for
doctrinal patent law.
In particular, this Article illuminates, and potentially resolves,
several scholarly debates concerning the role and limits of patents as

386. See U.S. Patent No. 5,891,459 (filed Nov. 9, 1995); John P. Cooke et al., Arginine Restores
Cholinergic Relaxation of Hypercholesterolemic Rabbit Thoracic Aorta, 83 CIRCULATION 1057,
1058–61 (1991).
387. Andrew M. Wilson, Randall Harada, Nandini Nair, Naras Balasubramanian & John P.
Cooke, L-Arginine Supplementation in Peripheral Arterial Disease: No Benefit and Possible Harm,
116 CIRCULATION 188, 188 (2007).
388. Data from LexMachina (www.lexmachina.com) show that, as of July 1, 2016, Thermolife
has sued at least fifty-four other entities for infringing this and related patents (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
389. See
Planet
Money:
The
Muscle
Patents,
NPR
(June
10,
2016),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=481597112 [https://perma.cc/T2
HR-KJCJ] (describing the background of Thermolife’s lawsuits).
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collections of scientific information. First, this Article’s findings are
informative about the limited role of patents as vehicles of scientific
disclosure—a hotly debated topic in current scholarship. The
presence—and continued validity—of patents grounded in
irreproducible data demonstrates that patents are poor conduits of upto-date, workable, practical disclosures of scientific information.
Second, this Article elucidates the difference between the doctrines of
utility and enablement: utility concerns whether a patent’s claims are
possible; enablement concerns whether a patent’s claims are probable.
And lastly, this Article suggests a resolution to the continuing problem
of whether, and to what extent, enablement should incorporate afterarising evidence: in short, it should. Evidence suggesting that the public
could not benefit from a patent’s disclosures shows that the patentee
did not fulfill patent law’s quid pro quo—and equally so if the evidence
comes before or after the inventor’s patent application.
A. Irreproducibility and the Limits of Disclosure
Among patent law scholars, there is a robust, recent debate
concerning the nature and scope of patent law’s disclosure
requirement.390 There appears to be broad consensus that the
disclosure requirement, as it is currently structured, does little to
inform scientists about critical advances in technology. Jason Rantanen
recently compiled academic criticism against this teaching function of
patents: “useless,” “incomplete and opaque,” and blind.391 Jeanne C.
Fromer also summarized the “good deal of [empirical]
evidence . . . that technologists do not find that [patents] contain[]
pertinent information for their research.”392 Inventors do not read one
another’s patents, scientists do not cite them in their papers, and
patentees do not turn to patents for inspiration.393 And Timothy R.
Holbrook noted that the value of truly cutting-edge information makes
patents’ supposed “[teaching] function . . . in tension, if not antithetical,
to the incentive theory of patent law.”394
And yet, many scholars have still lauded the disclosure
requirement as an important tool in “bridg[ing] the gap between patent

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See supra note 129.
Jason Rantanen, Peripheral Disclosure, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
Fromer, supra note 129, at 560.
Id. at 560–61.
Holbrook, supra note 129, at 133.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

904

[Vol. 66:845

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

law and the norms of science.”395 Sean B. Seymore has proposed
several benefits of patents as repositories of scientific information:
patents are free, in comparison to expensive academic journals; they
are automatically published eighteen months after they are filed; and
they serve as outlets for technical information when others are not
available.396 And Dmitry Karshtedt has noted that patents may serve
as signals of other, more useful information, “such as academic
publications and sales of products embodying patented inventions.”397
Alan Devlin has touted disclosure as simply being better than the
alternative: secrecy.398
But few have noted the difficulties concerning disclosure with
respect to reproducibility.399 Because patents are static documents,
they are poorly equipped to incorporate future findings that cast doubt
on their applicability. In the interim, they remain fixed (and
enforceable) for twenty years from the date which they were filed—
eons in certain fast-moving fields, like computer science. As a
consequence, innovators looking for truly informative, technical
disclosures in patents may, in many cases, be relying on information
that is either out of date or incorrect. And even in cases where patents
do disclose technical information rapidly, there may be various signs
that the data grounding a patent are likely to be irreproducible in the
future.400 The hardest cases, of course, concern patent disclosures that
appear to be enabling, but later turn out not to be.401
These cases—ubiquitous in pharmaceutical patents—strongly
counsel against thinking of the disclosure requirement as possessing a
teaching function or aligning scientific and legal norms. Patents may

395. E.g., Seymore, supra note 29, at 656.
396. Id. at 656–57.
397. Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. REV. 949,
1016 n.397 (2015).
398. Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 401, 417–18 (2010). Delvin notes:
[P]atent laws likely were not designed to appeal to the inventors of concealable
technology, for whom trade secret is the avenue of greatest allure. . . . [T]he
contemporary patent system with its many disclosure conditions would remain unused.
Society would be deprived of an understanding of [secret] invention[s] regardless of
the patent system’s existence.
Id.
399. Dmitry Karshtedt is one of the few who has tied together difficulties in the disclosure
requirement with reproducibility concerns, albeit in a few narrow cases concerning biotechnology.
See Karshtedt, supra note 4, at 110–11.
400. Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 218, 222.
401. See supra Part III.B.1.
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very well appear to teach others in the field useful information but in
fact—and not until long after the patent has issued—not teach anything
at all. This view runs counter to some recent scholarship suggesting that
the failings of the disclosure function could be solved by making it
more robust, by, for example, requiring working examples from patent
applicants.402 Therapies directed to long-term cancer treatments cannot
practically be subject to working examples during patent prosecution.
And yet, it is precisely such patents that are both financially valuable
and subject to charges of irreproducibility. Making the disclosure
doctrine more robust in such circumstances would do little to bridge
the gap between science and law.
This limited view of disclosure dovetails with recent work
concerning the costs and benefits of a dysfunctional disclosure regime.
Fromer, for example, has demonstrated just how “disclosure norms
and rules are lax.”403 This, Fromer argues, makes it costly for the public
to enforce a more robust disclosure requirement and gives innovation
policymakers “good reason to place the costs of adequate
informational disclosure on the patent applicant rather than on the
public (or the government), to which a greater portion of it is now
relegated.”404 The same is of course true for inventions of suspect
reproducibility. The disclosure norms in the pharmaceutical context
are substantially lax as compared to the regulatory work required to
bring products to market. But heightening reproducibility
requirements at the PTO by requiring more robust preclinical data may
not be worth the candle in light of subsequent regulatory delay.
As a consequence, patents that disclose irreproducible data
suggest only the narrowest of teaching functions, if they have one at all.
Even under the best circumstances—drugs, like Prempro, that have
gone through robust clinical trials, only to have more robust clinical
trials undermine their efficacy—it is unclear what was gained from the
disclosures in the patent document.

402. E.g., Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 214–16; Fiona E. Murray, Joshua S. Gans & Mackey
L. Craven, How Does the Republic of Science Shape the Patent System? Broadening the
Institutional Analysis of Innovation Beyond Patents, 1 U.C. IRV. L. REV. 357, 360 (2011); Seymore,
supra note 29, at 654–56.
403. Fromer, supra note 129, at 596.
404. Id.
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B. Irreproducibility and Utility
Like the Federal Circuit in Eli Lilly, scholars have traditionally
linked utility and enablement.405 Dan L. Burk and Lemley, for
example, famously described the connection in 2004: “[T]he definition
of enablement affects the patentability requirement of specific utility,
as the invention must operate as described in the specification if the
inventor is to enable one of ordinary skill to use it.”406 At the same time,
little scholarly attention has been focused on qualifying which doctrine
should apply depending upon how many embodiments of an invention
may make its patent’s claims inoperative. This has resulted in at least
some of the confusion in how to appropriately assess patents claiming
broad genuses of their technologies,407 after-arising embodiments,408 or
cases where “some members of [embodiments] x have utility, and some
do not.”409
This Article’s recognition that irreproducibility may render some
patent claims useful but not enabling suggests one avenue of relief: the
overlap between utility and enablement only appears meaningful
where no embodiments of the claims are workable.410 By contrast,
because of the varied nature of irreproducibility,411 patents grounded
in irreproducible data do not necessarily fail in all cases—and as a
consequence, the two doctrines appear to work independently. Indeed,
utility only appears to serve as a proxy for enablement when follow-on
studies produce contradictory results.412 When future studies are
simply unable to replicate prior results,413 or produce effect sizes

405. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1164 n.78 (2008); Seymore, supra note 210, at 1068
(“Under current law, an invention which lacks utility under § 101 also fails as a matter of law to
comply with the enablement requirement of § 112(a).”).
406. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 691, 709 (2004).
407. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 102
(2011) (“The difficult question is determining whether the specification has enabled the broad
genus.”).
408. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105.
409. Lefstin, supra note 405, at 1164 n.78.
410. See supra notes 227–34 and accompanying text.
411. For a demonstration of the heterogeneity of irreproducibility in pharmaceuticals, see
supra Part III.B.
412. For a discussion of Prempro, see supra Part III.B.1.
413. See Drummond, supra note 4, at 2. For a discussion of Xigris, see supra Part III.B.2.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

PATENT LAW’S REPRODUCIBILITY PARADOX

907

smaller or larger than those determined originally,414 this does not
mean that inventions based on earlier studies fail as a matter of course.
Put more pithily, one way to recognize the difference between utility
and enablement is this: utility concerns possibility; enablement
concerns probability.
This understanding should also be useful for courts addressing
similar questions concerning reproducibility. A patent with claims
drawn to several irreproducible—and disenabling—embodiments but
with a single enabling embodiment still possesses utility; the patent has
a use for persons having ordinary skill in the patent’s art. Invalidating
such a patent on utility grounds would consequently be wrong as a
matter of doctrine.415 Nor would it fulfill the purpose of the utility
requirement to prohibit the patenting of trivial or useless inventions.416
The doctrine of enablement, rather—the doctrine concerning the
strength and accuracy of the patent’s disclosure—seems much better
suited to the task of invalidating patents claiming multiple
irreproducible embodiments. Courts looking to utility to resolve
questions of irreproducibility rather than enablement therefore have
the potential to hamstring themselves by only invalidating impossible
or contradictory patents. Clearly differentiating the two doctrines
would provide courts a single, clear avenue to assess claims of
disenabling irreproducibility.
C. Irreproducibility and After-Arising Evidence
Lastly, the nature of irreproducible patents also strongly favors
current scholarly—and judicial—trends calling for the introduction of
postapplication evidence to prove a lack of enablement.417 As
highlighted by In re ’318 Patent and Eli Lilly, enablement sets no clear
rules for when postapplication evidence can be introduced to
challenge—or support—a patent’s validity.418 This is problematic for

414. See Ioannidis, Contradicted Effects, supra note 9, at 222 (describing different effect sizes
in follow-on clinical studies). For a discussion of using Avastin to treat breast cancer, see supra
Part III.B.4.
415. See Seymore, supra note 210, at 1048 (“A low utility threshold aligns with the broad
policy goals of the patent system.”).
416. See id. at 1075–76.
417. See supra Part II.A.
418. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth LLC, 435 F. App’x 917, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(allowing future evidence to satisfy enablement); In re ’318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d
1317, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (disallowing postapplication evidence to satisfy enablement); see also
supra Part II.A.
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patents based on irreproducible data because the nature of
irreproducibility is post hoc: whether a study is or is not reproducible
can only be determined after the original study has been completed.419
This has several normative advantages. Allowing postapplication
evidence in enablement assessments would therefore strongly
discourage patents fixed in irreproducible data. Patentees faced with
the choice of filing early applications based on skimpy—and likely
irreproducible—data, or waiting to perfect their applications with
more robust data, should, all else equal, choose the latter. Patent
applicants without such options may consider narrowing their claims to
better encompass the certainty—or lack thereof—of their inventions.
And challengers of putatively invalid patents would be encouraged to
spend litigation resources demonstrating the irreproducibility of the
patents asserted against them—a rare example of litigation strategy
and scientific advancement aligning. In any of these cases, opening
patent challenges to postapplication evidence weeds irreproducible
data from the greater patent landscape.
As indicated by the diverging opinions in In re ’318 Patent and Eli
Lilly, the role of postapplication evidence in enablement challenges is
governed judicially.420 And there is nothing in the enablement statute
to suggest that postapplication evidence should never be considered in
raising questions of enablement.421 The Federal Circuit should
therefore explicitly permit the introduction of postapplication
evidence to challenge irreproducible patents’ lack of enablement—
with several boundaries.
First, a long line of enablement precedent has defined the doctrine
as whether a person having ordinary skill in the art could have made
and used the invention without undue experimentation at the time of
the patent application.422 Accordingly, the ultimate inquiry for whether
postapplication evidence proves the invalidity of an issued patent
should be worded as whether the postapplication evidence
demonstrates that a person having ordinary skill in the art could not
have made or used the invention at the time of the patent application.
419. See Stodden, supra note 4, at 1 (“A fundamental goal of statistics is to ensure the
reproducibility of scientific findings. . . . If discoveries are made, it is of great interest to
understand whether these findings persist in different samples . . . . The persistence of findings
across different samples is the basis upon which scientific claims are evaluated.”).
420. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 925–26; In re ’318 Patent, 583 F.3d at 1327.
421. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
422. See Collins, supra note 13, at 1098–1105 (discussing these cases); see also Lemley, supra
note 13, at 106–07 (discussing this in the context of claim interpretation).
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This standard seems squarely in line with the enablement statute.
Currently codified at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), it makes no mention of when
enablement evidence must have been published or created, or even
when the enablement inquiry arises. It requires only that the
specification enable others to “make and use” the invention.423 Further,
allowing postapplication evidence to assess enablement traces the basic
contours of a scientific understanding of irreproducibility, an inquiry
typically focused on whether an original study was, in fact, true to begin
with.424
Second, the introduction of postapplication evidence to combat
enablement should not turn on whether the issue was raised by the
patent examiner during prosecution, in contravention of Eli Lilly.425
Patent prosecution is, in many senses, “an ongoing negotiation
between the PTO and the applicant.”426 Formal challenges by the
examiner to the apparent irreproducibility of a patent application’s
claims therefore likely turn on the content of negotiations—or lack
thereof—between an applicant and the PTO. Such challenges may also
reflect the drafting skill of the patent attorney or the whim of the
examiner, rather than the level of irreproducibility of the patent
application’s source data. Future challengers to issued patents should
not be precluded from raising similar issues simply because the
examiner was slack.427
Third, postapplication evidence should not be limited to only
“notoriously intractable areas such as cures for baldness or cancer.”428
Other areas of scientific inquiry—and patenting—similarly suffer from
irreproducible data, such as genetic testing,429 antibody research,430 and
423. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The statute states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use the same . . . .
Id.
424. See Ioannidis, Research Findings, supra note 9, at 696 (describing reproducibility as the
circumstance in which “research findings are compared against the gold standard of true
relationships in a scientific field”).
425. See Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 924–25.
426. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
427. Cf. The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“[W]hen some
have thought a device necessary, at least we may say that they were right, and the others too
slack. . . . [But this] does not bear on [liability] at all.”).
428. Eli Lilly, 435 F. App’x at 924.
429. Ioannidis et al., Replication Validity, supra note 9, at 306; Kane, supra note 248, at 838.
430. Baker, supra note 86, at 274.

SHERKOW IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1/5/2017 11:59 AM

910

[Vol. 66:845

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

even social sciences.431 Because enablement is assessed for each
patent—independent of its field of art—patents in less “intractable”
fields may still suffer from irreproducible results. Those patents should
be no less subject to postapplication evidence.
Demanding a full-scope analysis would therefore have the
beneficial effect of invalidating broad patents that cover irreproducible
embodiments—a sensible interpretation of the patent statute’s
requirement that patents must inform their users to “make and use”
the invention.432 It would also strongly discourage patentees from filing
overbroad claims in the first instance, and patentees would either rely
on stronger data to prove their possession of the invention or narrow
their claims to comport with the data they have. Irreproducible
patents—such as those broadly claiming “a method of treating cancer”
where preclinical trials suggest only a narrower indication—would
consequently run afoul of this proscription.433
To be sure, embracing the full-scope doctrine has disadvantages.
It cuts against the principle that patent claims can—and sometimes
should—encompass after-arising technologies.434 Inventors, for
example, may be able to fully possess and describe their claims—even
if they are unaware of precise applications of their technologies.435 And
a full-scope doctrine suffers from the fact that, at some level, “[t]here
is always an unforeseen embodiment that falls within a claim.”436
Bernard Chao has linked this principle to essential fairness: “[A] claim
should not be invalidated simply because the inventor did not foresee
every embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.”437
431. Stodden, supra note 4, at 3–4.
432. See supra note 423.
433. See Holbrook, supra note 129, at 157–58. Holbrook notes:
Enablement doctrine performs this role of confining the scope of the claims to what
the inventor actually possessed. . . . This limit on the scope is particularly important in
unpredictable art fields. For example, if a patentee discovers a cure for ovarian cancer,
she likely will not be able to claim curing all forms of cancer. She can only claim that
which the PHOSITA objectively recognized would be in the inventor’s possession.
Id.
434. See Chao, supra note 14, at 1378 (“[A] claim should not be invalidated simply because
the inventor did not foresee every embodiment that may eventually fall within its scope.”);
Collins, supra note 13, at 1084–85 (arguing that some instances of after-arising technology should
be covered by earlier-drafted claims); Holbrook, supra note 129, at 158 (“To require disclosure
of every variant would be extremely costly and burdensome to both the applicant and the PTO.”).
435. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 13, at 1107–08 (discussing this in the context of protein
identification and synthesis); Feldman, supra note 13, at 20–21 (discussing interferons); Lemley,
supra note 13, at 116–17 (discussing antibodies).
436. Chao, supra note 14, at 1378.
437. Id.
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But it is one thing to allow claims to encompass unforeseen
developments in technology and another to allow them to cover
technologies that failed to work when they were drafted. Supporting
the former simply further encourages the drafting of overbroad claims,
one of the central problems in patents today.438 Further, these criticisms
of the full-scope doctrine seem to be outweighed by the heft of
enablement’s purpose: that inventors should only be allowed to patent
that which they can teach others to make and do.439 Aligning the fullscope doctrine with enablement would do much to ensure that patent
claims are actually enabled rather than being irreproducible. The
solution is to simply require patentees to draft their claims more
narrowly where the possibility of future disenabling evidence is low.
CONCLUSION
Although scientific and technological progress ultimately depend
on reproducibility, patent law—and the doctrine of enablement, in
particular—does little to promote it. Enablement’s ambiguities
concerning the role of postapplication evidence, the scope of the
enablement inquiry, and the doctrine’s relationship with utility all
remain unresolved and favor patents grounded in early, irreproducible
data. Pharmaceutical patents seem especially susceptible to these
incentives encouraging irreproducibility—with truly problematic
results. The widespread existence of such patents informs us a great
deal about the true role of enablement in patent law. It strongly
suggests that reproducibility analyses should factor into enablement
determinations: patents that disclose irreproducible inventions simply
fail to enable others to “make and use” the claimed inventions. It also
demonstrates the limits of patents as vehicles of scientific disclosure.
And it resolves the current doctrinal tension between utility and
enablement. These lessons concerning reproducibility in patent law
should better align scientific practice with innovation policy and
prevent the current incentive structure of disenablement.

438. See Mark A. Lemley, Michael Risch, Ted Sichelman & R. Polk Wagner, Life After Bilski,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1339–41 (2011) (describing the problem of overbreadth in identifying the
“abstract idea” of a patent’s claims). See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope,
57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197 (2016) (discussing the idea of scope across intellectual property
disciplines).
439. See Seymore, supra note 29, at 652 (“[T]he teaching function and enablement are
inextricably related . . . .”).

